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ARTICLES
THE SEGREGATION OF MARKETS
By: Christian Turner*
ABSTRACT
Campaign-finance reformers fear that rich donors’ money can be used dis-
proportionately to influence the content of campaign advertising and thus,
perhaps, the results of elections. In European football, UEFA has attempted
to ban “financial doping”—rich owners’ use of money earned in sectors other
than football to pay large sums for the best football players. Campaign-fi-
nance reform efforts and “financial fair play” rules in sport may seem like
bespoke solutions to different problems. In fact, they are the same solution to
the same problem. Both are attempts to ensure that power accumulated in one
market is not brought into another market so as to distort and damage its
proper functioning. Market segregation, which seeks to bar explicit or implicit
trans-market “currency” exchanges, disconnects the markets’ decisionmaking
rationales. By understanding the segregation regulatory tool and its character-
istic difficulties, including the appearance of black-market currency exchanges
and the entrenchment of incumbents, it is possible to see in more general terms
the challenges in many other legal settings, including moral rights and so-
called “repugnant transactions.”
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[I]t is the meaning of goods that determines their movements.1
– Michael Walzer
I. INTRODUCTION
A common way to think about the legal system is as a publicly ad-
ministered set of rules that ultimately regulates behavior in “the mar-
ket” or in some set of private spheres. From this point of view, there
is, on the one hand, natural human interaction proceeding under the
rules of society and, ultimately, of physics. On the other hand, there
are the purpose-built rules made by public institutions and applied to
disputes, rules that claim authority over the various forces internal to
the market. When the market processes would, if unmolested, lead to
bad results, the case for public regulations becomes stronger. And so
modern regulatory theory centers on identifying bad market out-
comes, often in neoliberal terms, and assessing whether regulatory in-
terventions might improve on them.
I follow a different course in this Article. There is not one thing that
is the market and then another that is the public regulatory apparatus.
There is instead just a set of cooperating people, and there are many,
many overlapping subsets of this group of people that all function as
decisionmaking entities, “markets,” that are each subject to the poten-
tial influence of all the other markets. Seen in this way, a society is a
collection of markets, the participants in each of which interact under
collectively enforced rules respecting the relative power that the mar-
ket assigns them.
An individual market is, like the whole society of which it is a part,
a cooperative enterprise. Its organization has some cooperative pur-
pose. In sum, a market is a subset of a society that is ultimately in-
tended to decide some discrete things. Indeed, when we casually use
the word “market,” we do so to describe not the totality of the attrib-
1. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 8 (1983).
2020] THE SEGREGATION OF MARKETS 301
utes and activities of its participants but the mechanisms for their co-
operation regarding these decisions. Through markets of various
kinds, we decide how many and what kinds of televisions to produce,
how much to invest in research and development of a particular tech-
nology, whom to educate and in what way, and which people should
serve as public representatives. Whether through dollars, votes, or
unilateral command, power is deployed in diverse ways within the
group’s many markets and variously aggregated in each of them to
reach decisions.2
It is natural to wonder how all these markets might best interact,
given that their purposes and mechanics might not always be sympa-
thetically aligned. For example, the market in cars functions both to
direct social resources to producing the right number and types of cars
and to allocate them to individuals, subject to those individuals’ and
society’s relative desires for other goods.3 It is sensible to connect this
market seamlessly with other markets in material (and some non-ma-
terial) goods for two reasons. First, car production comes at the ex-
pense of other forms of production, and information must therefore
be exchanged between markets to coordinate effort. Second, satisfy-
ing individual desires in the car market is incentivized by granting
people power—in some proportion to their contribution to that satis-
faction—to acquire goods in other markets. Car producers need to
eat. A common currency for goods (money) and the price mechanism
together accomplish the seamless linking between the car market and
other markets that serves these functions.
But the purposes of some markets, like the market that produces
public legislation, are fundamentally unlike those of the market for
cars and would be severely diminished in quality by this sort of direct
connection.4 We not only use different currencies in the car market
and the legislation market, dollars and votes respectively, but we go
further and forbid currency exchanges between one and the other. In
other words, we segregate these markets by force of law.
I define “segregation” of one market from another to mean regula-
tion, however imposed, that prevents power accumulated in one mar-
ket from being used as power in the other. Segregation is intended to
render the decisionmaking methods of the subject markets causally
disconnected from one another. A simple example is a public corrup-
2. As Michael Walzer has put it: “[T]here has never been a single criterion, or a
single set of interconnected criteria, for all distributions.” Id. at 4.
3. See W. Earl Sesser, Match Supply and Demand in Service Industries, HARV.
BUS. REV. (1976), https://hbr.org/1976/11/match-supply-and-demand-in-service-indus
tries [https://perma.cc/7DW6-W6XD].
4. No two cooperative instances are identical, and, in some small sense at least,
they possess distinct distributive logics. “Every social good or set of goods constitutes,
as it were, a distributive sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements
are appropriate.” Id. at 10. But segregation comes at a cost that is not always worth
paying in light of the benefits of linkage. See infra Section II.C.5.
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tion law that prohibits a judge from taking a bribe. The market in
public justice is thought to perform its function better when power in
financial markets does not influence the currencies of power within
the public justice market. If a judge cannot accept payment in ex-
change for a favorable ruling, then financial power cannot be used
(directly at least) to affect judicial decisions. With this prohibition,
therefore, reasons arising from fear and desire in finance will not by
dint of their foundation in material wealth translate automatically to
reasons for law. This simple example, because of the rather obvious
but indirect ways financial wealth can indeed influence legal out-
comes, hints at the complexity and practical difficulty of segregation.
This Article aims to consider how and why markets are segregated
from one another. Why do some freely exchange currencies and
others forbid it? A common answer might be that I am confusing two
types of institutions, exchange-based markets and cooperative institu-
tions. But the distinction between “markets” and other institutions is
neither obvious nor so fixed as to be corporeal, and the benefits for at
least some forms of analysis of seeing the many forms of human inter-
action as variations on a central theme are, I will argue, substantial.
Therefore, I wish to understand the segregation of markets without
resorting to argument by label—that is without simply asserting that
one thing is a market while another is not.
Mere definition does no useful work in establishing that a border
between institutions should be impervious to power transfer. I will in-
stead recognize the essential similarities among institutional types. Us-
ing the same terminology—markets, currency, and power—focuses
our attention on what is really distinct among the various subsets of
human interaction that compose a society. If we are to conclude that
some decisionmaking institutions should be called this and others that,
it should be because we have made a defensible conceptual distinction
that a terminological schism makes more readily perceptible. The sim-
ple binary of market and non-market obscures, as to some basic ques-
tions, more than it enlightens.
But why study segregation as a distinct legal mode apart from any
other kind of regulation? I argue here that the sort of intervention
represented by segregation is qualitatively different from other forms
of market regulation in its regulatory purpose and design. Most other
types of regulation are designed to avert and to rectify so-called mar-
ket failures that are internal to the regulated market. For example,
regulations aimed at principal–agent problems, regulations intended
to avert tragedies of the commons, and regulations counteracting (di-
rectly or indirectly) dynamically increasing levels of inequality of mar-
ket power all combat problems arising within a single decisionmaking
structure.
Segregation, in contrast, aims at problems arising from those
maldistributions of decisionmaking power that have exogenous causes.
2020] THE SEGREGATION OF MARKETS 303
That is, one way that a market can fail to achieve its purpose is that its
decisionmaking calculus is skewed by power accumulated outside the
market itself and exchanged for power within it, as in the judicial brib-
ery example above. Regulations internal to the market, focusing on
internal market transactions, will likely not be sufficient to solve the
problem. Instead, regulations must target the power misallocation by
somehow prohibiting currency exchange, the use in the troubled mar-
ket of power gained elsewhere.
The Article begins, in the next Part, by elaborating the model that I
use to contrast segregation and internal forms of regulation. I situate
my approach to market definition, what I call the “institutional mod-
els”5 approach, by distinguishing it from the “strong market-ontology
school” used by some sociologists and from the “school of discrete
spheres”6 advanced by some distributive justice theorists. The taxon-
omy of markets I develop turns on: (1) currency definition (represen-
tation of decisional power), (2) decision rules, (3) currency
redistribution rules, (4) regulation of what I call “secondary influence
markets,”7 and (5) currency exchange rules governing when power in
external markets can be brought in and used in the market.
In Part III, I turn to examples of market segregation and choose
two factually distinct but conceptually similar markets. One is the
market for political campaigning. Campaign-finance reform efforts at-
tempt to control the flow of power between the election market and
the financial markets,8 in other words to shut down the currency ex-
change between dollars and votes. This goal has been described as
elusive on account of the many diversions money can take in response
to “hydraulic” pressures.9 Indeed, I will consider the ubiquitous prob-
lem in market segregation of multiple points of leakage and the prob-
lem of detection. Where direct currency exchange is banned, more
indirect routes for exchange are sought and exploited.10 So too for
institutions generally.
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See infra Section II.B.
7. These are markets that produce information intended to influence the use of
currency, and thus decisionmaking, in the primary market.
8. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–32 (2003) (discussing develop-
ments in campaign financing that led Congress to pass the Bipartisan Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Act to the Federal Election Campaign Act), overruled in part by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
9. See Pamela S. Karlan & Samuel Issacharoff, The Hydraulics of Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713–17 (1999) (describing how, within the cam-
paign finance system, “[m]oney, like water, will seek its own level”).
10. See, e.g., PABLO SLUTZKY, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING PUBLIC EVIDENCE
FROM MULTINATIONAL FIRMS OPERATING IN EMERGING MARKETS 11 (2018), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2928711 [https://perma.cc/TH98-KS4F] (describing Argentina’s de-
ployment of foreign exchange limitation in 2011 and the consequent black market);
MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS
49 (2006).
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Surprisingly closely related conceptually is the market for players in
European football, in which the Union of European Football Associa-
tions (“UEFA”) serves as a regulator.11 There, so-called “financial fair
play” rules represent an attempt to define the proper currency of
power within the market and to sever that currency from power accu-
mulated irrelevantly in other markets.12 The problem, somewhat
counterintuitively, is that some team owners are win-maximizing
rather than profit-maximizing, indulging a consumptive preference for
owning a winning football team. The upshot is that vast sums acquired
in other markets, like finance, petroleum, or political graft, can create
a near-instantly competitive team without regard to the level of sup-
port the team otherwise enjoys among fans. That “natural” level of
power, meaning the assignment of power consistent with a league’s
assumed purpose, would be gained from transactions like ticket sales,
television contracts, and jersey sales—not the largesse of an owner
who views possession of a football team as the conspicuous consump-
tion of the world’s most expensive racehorse. Under this framing, it is
more apparent that the struggle over financial fair play, just as with
campaign finance reform, reduces to disagreement concerning a
league’s purpose and, secondarily, to the practicality of segregation. I
will discuss the nature of this problem and the reasons that a market
segregation remedy has been attempted.
Other examples abound, including the market for public justice and
the rules applicable to lawyers, judges, and litigants. Even by calling
this a market, I may appear to be tilting the analysis toward a ne-
oliberal understanding of public justice as yet another forum of war-
ring preferences and exchange. That is not my intention. The
ontological similarity of, for example, banking and insurance markets
on the one hand and judicial systems on the other is in their shared
identities as purposeful, regulated institutions intended to reach col-
lective decisions. The investments, trade-offs, preference types, and
other aspects of the justice system are different from those in other
markets. It is these differences that necessitate the prevention of
power in those markets from being deployed to gain decisionmaking
power in the justice system. But it also works the other way: decision-
making power in the justice system and other public, political systems
is segregated from direct power in economic markets. The former
leakage is what we usually call public corruption.13 The latter is influ-
11. See About the UEFA, UEFA, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/582J-842F].
12. Protecting the Game, UEFA (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/
protecting-the-game/news/newsid=2048884.html [https://perma.cc/NZV2-GJNQ]
(“[UEFA] introduced Financial Fair Play measures aimed at bringing discipline, ra-
tionality and responsibility to clubs’ financial management, and [to] curb the financial
excesses which have endangered the existence of certain clubs.”).
13. Public Corruption, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/public
_corruption (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3N9A-4NBQ].
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ence peddling, also corruption, but its primary harm is to the efficien-
cies of the markets in which officially accumulated power counts for
“too much” among the array of private preferences and currency that
constitute them.14
The institutional perspective also sheds light on other areas of deci-
sionmaking in which the public evinces convictions that money should
not determine a decision. I consider the problems of artists’ moral
rights and repugnant transactions in Part IV. As with the primary ex-
amples, these areas too are home to seemingly domain-specific argu-
mentation about how decisions should be reached. Again, it is
possible to see the segregation dynamic at work if the relevant deci-
sionmaking structures are put into focus.
Finally, in Part V, I make some initial observations concerning
when resort to segregation is likely in the general case. The primary
considerations are whether the market’s decisionmaking is necessarily
entangled with another’s and whether there is social convergence on
distinct and incompatible purposes between the markets.
II. THE PROBLEM
What is a market? As with the concept of law itself, there has long
been an effort to define the term and thereby to distinguish a market
from other forms of social organization.15 Noting something distinc-
tive about a set of particular instances of behaviors is to latch onto
underlying patterns of cause and effect in the otherwise impossibly
complex world of human interaction. To take all that is happening in a
region of time, space, and certain human minds and call it a “market”
adorns a physical cacophony with a label that suggests abstract regu-
larity. One explanation for the discordant definitions and uses of the
term is that the regularity we seek to identify differs depending on the
purpose of our analysis.16
We will make progress by acknowledging from the start that
whatever we mean by “market” is approximate. As with all theoretical
descriptions of social activities, we seek not to understand exact real-
ity but to build a useful model.17 The process of definition is one of
creating an abstract thought-object that behaves sensibly within our
broader model of society and thus enables prediction and understand-
ing. In this Article, I ask how and when a society might choose to
separate some of its intuitively recognizable decisionmaking structures
14. See, e.g., Patrick J. Dellay, Curbing Influence Peddling in Albany: The 1987
Ethics in Government Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1988).
15. See RICHARD SWEDBERG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 130 (2003).
16. Cf. DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 15–17 (1987) (describing
the virtues in different scenarios of adopting the physical, design, or intentional
stance).
17. See Christian Turner, Models of Law, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1293, 1311–16
(2018) (describing how models are used as representations of complex subjects).
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from others so that the former will operate more or less independently
of the latter. The first step in doing that, in segregating markets, is to
define these structures as theoretical objects. Let us begin by consider-
ing three approaches: the “strong market-ontology school,” the
“school of discrete spheres,” and the “institutional models” approach
I advocate here.
I will settle on the last approach and proceed to elaborate the func-
tional distinctions among cooperative institutions, creating a typology
of markets that illustrates their diversity, their kinship, and the ways
they overlap, work together, and wall themselves apart. The initial
goal of the “institutional models” theory is to shift our viewpoint,
freeing ourselves of tacit assumptions about sharp ontological distinc-
tions between markets and other forms, seeing the internal power
structures and currencies of all institutions as variations on a theme,
and following the germ of that idea to build a field guide of institu-
tions as seen through the market lens.
A. The Strong Market-Ontology School
The first approach to defining markets I will survey arises from the
efforts of sociologists and other researchers to achieve a clear distinc-
tion between the markets they wish to study and other social forms,
such as corporate hierarchies and centralized social planning struc-
tures.18 I call their approach the “strong market-ontology school,” be-
cause in pursuing their purpose of modeling well and with
particularity those institutional forms they conclude are markets, they
identify a definite category of human decisionmaking and distinguish
it from others. Doing so, of course, makes a great deal of sense. By
focusing on differentiating features, researchers may then use more
specialized models to make predictions about how an institution bear-
ing those features will behave. If one’s goal, for example, is predicting
the incidence of traffic accidents, modeling “car driving” rather than
the more generic “vehicle operation”—which might include piloting
planes, boats, and forklifts—will be the more useful approach. While I
will not hew to this strong form of distinction, this school’s functional
categorization of institutional features will help determine when mar-
kets, understood in a broader sense, should be made to work in con-
cert and when in isolation. So a sketch of this methodology is
warranted.
Many strong ontological approaches begin with commonly held no-
tions about markets. But even in ordinary talk, “the market” can have
several meanings. Perhaps the simplest conceived, if not articulated, is
“the socio-economic phenomenon which takes place in the market-
18. Eckehard F. Rosenbaum, What Is a Market? On the Methodology of a Con-
tested Concept, 58 REV. SOC. ECON. 455, 463 (2000).
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place of a city or town.”19 This sense of the word draws a connection
between a location (the “place” in “marketplace”) and a social activity
involving exchange that predominates there. But, especially these
days, casual conversation about “the market” is often about a social
phenomenon itself, irrespective of place. So used, the term corrals a
set of exchange-related behaviors into a unit of thinking, an object for
discussion, not a reference to a location with special attributes. This
theoretical but casual sense could be deployed extremely generally
(e.g., the whole set of potential transactions one could engage in for
money),20 merely generally (a particular subset of exchange opportu-
nities defined usually by regularization of those opportunities), or spe-
cifically (the market in a particular stock, for example).
In a particularly clear and helpful analysis, sociologist Eckehard
Rosenbaum describes three approaches—observational, functional,
and structural—to identifying markets compatible with this more gen-
eral and modern sense.21 Observational definitions require empirical
phenomena together with the presence of stylized facts about what is
observed.22 For example, one might insist there be an actual market-
place or physical exchanges of goods (empirical phenomena) and also
insist there be some minimal stability of prices (stylized facts). If you
observe these things, under this observational formulation, you are
observing a market.23
Functional definitions instead look for a social activity that has a
particular effect.24 Perhaps we define the market as the set of activi-
ties that together serve as an allocation mechanism.25 In other words,
a market “is” the product of the invisible hand and whatever contrib-
utes to it.26 Or perhaps the market is whatever imposes an ordering or
19. Id. at 456.
20. Note the circularity here. To define the market as money-based transactions,
or, even if money is not used, those that could potentially be backed by money, is to
beg the question. We decide to use money in a decisionmaking area precisely when
we want the dynamics of other money-connected markets to influence this one. But
when do we want that to happen? That is the basic question.
21. Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 458–60.
22. Id. at 458.
23. See id. at 458–59.
24. See id. at 459 (“[F]unctional definitions focus on what the market does rather
on what . . . the market is.”).
25. See id.
26. See id. (“[T]he market is essentially regarded as an allocation mechanism (or
more metaphorically as an ‘invisible hand’ as in Adam Smith’s work) . . . .”). Cele-
brated French mathematician and economist Augustin Cournot is often cited for his
definition, given in a footnote: “It is well known that by market economists mean, not
a certain place where purchases and sales are carried on, but the entire territory of
which the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted commerce that prices
there take the same level throughout, with ease and rapidity.” AUGUSTIN COURNOT,
RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH
51–52 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., London, MacMillan & Co. 1897) (1838). As with
most strong ontological formulations, Cournot’s functional approach was conducive
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equilibrium of social activities—whatever creates prices.27 Thus, a
market might be defined as a disaggregated social activity that has the
effect of stably ordering competing desires with respect to a particular
good or set of goods.28 In a way, functional definitions are also obser-
vational, but they depend more on observations of the effects of be-
haviors than on the behaviors themselves. The functionalist thus finds
a market by observing outputs and identifying their causes.
Structural definitions identify networks of exchange and understand
the market to include “mechanisms [that] structure, organize, and le-
gitimate” those exchanges.29 The market therefore is the set of prop-
erty rights, contractual rights, and enforcement regimes that surround
exchanges and have the effect of identifying networks of exchange.30
Geoffrey Hodgson, for example, notes that the market is not just the
exchanges themselves, because those exchanges are “facilitated and
structured” by the social institutions that exist to legitimate them.31
Just as the legal system may be more usefully conceived as emanating
from the rule of recognition and other secondary rules rather than just
being the primary rules it then generates,32 a market can be conceived
as including the secondary social rules that define and support its pri-
mary activities.
Rosenbaum himself rejects these approaches, suggesting they do
not internally cohere or are not separately sufficient to distinguish
markets from other social forms, such as hierarchies, firms, central
planning, and casual exchange.33 Rather, to assert there is a social ob-
ject called a market is to claim there is something that can be theo-
to his purpose, creating a mathematical model of demand, in the chapter in which the
definition appeared. Id. at 44–55.
27. See Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 459–60.
28. See, e.g., D. Satz, Market and Nonmarket Allocation, in 20 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 9197, 9197–98 (Neil J.
Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). For the purpose of contrasting forms of social
organization, Satz posits markets as “mechanisms for the production, circulation, and
valuation of goods and services” that in fact are “efficient, impersonal, and oriented
to individual preference and choice.” Id. at 9197. Once so defined, we can model
markets and observe “market failures” empirically as deviations from these character-
istics. Id. at 9198–99.
29. Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 460 (quoting GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECO-
NOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS: A MANIFESTO FOR A MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOM-
ICS 174 (1988)).
30. Id.
31. HODGSON, supra note 29, at 174 (“We shall here define the market as a set of
social institutions in which a large number of commodity exchanges of a specific type
regularly take place, and to some extent are facilitated and structured by those institu-
tions. Exchange as defined above, involves contractual agreement and the exchange
of property rights, and the market consists in part of mechanisms to structure, organ-
ize and legitimate these activities. Markets, in short, are organized and institutional-
ized exchange.”).
32. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994).
33. Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 461–62.
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rized, “in the sense of making general law-like statements about it.”34
If a market can be theorized at all, there should be some basic quali-
ties that permit us to reach conclusions about what is likely to unfold
as the market proceeds under various conditions.
For Rosenbaum, a market is a system of disaggregated, impersonal,
competitive exchange. In his own terms, it is characterized by ongoing
exchanges that are voluntary,35 specified,36 typical,37 regular,38 and
competitive. The primary consideration here is that exchanges must
be impersonal and based on stable desires for relatively well-defined
goods, not primarily related to the impact of the exchange on the so-
cial statuses of the participants.39 This criterion is worth keeping in
mind for what follows because it imposes by definition the very thing I
wish to study: the segregation of power in one kind of market (per-
haps a supposedly impersonal exchange) from that in others (social
structures that have conferred heterogeneous levels of in-group sta-
tus). If the goal is to define markets to enable the kind of theorizing
that relies on both coherency of price and agents’ actions being in
furtherance of preference satisfaction, then it is indeed important to
assume away infusions of irrelevant capital—and thus to have a theory
of relevancy.
Rosenbaum’s definitional exercise reflects a normative assumption
that some forms of power should not be spendable in a market, even if
we restrict our attention to the most conventional kinds of markets.
For example, if money represents power in a market for grain, then
the unfolding allocation of grain might be difficult to theorize and to
predict if currencies other than money can chaotically substitute for or
add influence to a participant’s supply of money. Thus, by defining a
market in a way that excludes this possibility, we are really embedding
an unstated theory of the relevance of power. The true “market” for
grain is a social object that is protected from power accumulated in
arenas of social cooperation assumed to be irrelevant.40 While the def-
34. Id. at 464.
35. By voluntary, Rosenbaum means that there is a substantial enough possibility
of exit that the fact that a bargain occurs conveys pricing information. Id. at 467–69.
36. By specified, Rosenbaum means something similar to the presence of explicit
consideration on each side of a bargain, thereby excluding gifts and vague expectan-
cies. It would also exclude relational contracts so poorly defined that they resist pric-
ing. Id. at 466–68.
37. By typicality of exchange, Rosenbaum means the substantial similarity of the
underlying substance of transactions viewed across large numbers of exchanges. Id. at
471. Again, this is functionally tied to the working of the price mechanism, which
requires some stability of comparison.
38. Regularity is similarly tasked with identifying transactional similarity in the
temporal dimension. Id. Here too, we look for exchange behaviors that give rise to
price stability, not necessarily constancy but sufficient stability that transactions in the
putative family of exchanges can be seen to be related.
39. Id. at 472–73.
40. It is interesting that Rosenbaum’s “most extreme case” on the competitiveness
scale is one in which the buyer and seller are behind a modified Rawlsian veil. Id. at
310 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
initional claim is only descriptive, there is an implied but substantial
normative bite.41
The goal of all of these efforts—observational, functional, struc-
tural, and hybrid—is to identify a category of collective decisionmak-
ing mechanisms that will be susceptible to a particular kind of
analysis. To oversimplify: if there are exchanges of a good satisfying
these sorts of definitions, then we will observe something like a price
mechanism operating as an invisible hand. To know, therefore, the
evolution of the decisionmaking system, we need only analyze individ-
ual decisionmaking in the face of such a price system.42 And to do
that, perhaps we can use the rational actor model or a behavioralist
modification of it.43 Then we would have a model of the defined cate-
gory of social activity that can generate non-obvious predictions.
Rosenbaum’s definition, for example, provides qualities that iden-
tify suitable candidates for a field of such modeling. As he acknowl-
edges, these qualities are mere tendencies, things that can exist in
greater or lesser measure within a conceptual grouping of behaviors,
leading to “degrees of marketness” rather than a binary.44 But his
multi-part definition helps us see that there is more than just a one-
dimensional spectrum of institutions with true markets lying at one
end and institutions becoming less market-like the further away one
gets.45
A more realistic look at the broader mass of behavior sees four
dimensions, not just one, of more or less: voluntariness, typicality, reg-
ularity, and competitiveness.46 Imagine a highly voluntary and com-
petitive regime in which bidders compete for goods that are nothing
like one another, other than that the same group of individuals is bid-
ding. In this “steampunk” marketplace, ever more strange and rare
473. They do not know one another’s identities or social status (though they do know
their own) and therefore are ignorant concerning how the exchange will affect their
power shares in the social arenas outside the market in which the exchange is occur-
ring. Just as with an analysis of public justice, the veil exercise here is an attempt to
isolate a participant’s purpose to that which optimizes the collective endeavor under
an assumed goal.
41. See id. at 463.
42. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Ec-
onomic Analysis of Law 3 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
53, 1998), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/608/ [https://per
ma.cc/H38Z-2V3D].
43. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–81 (1998).
44. See Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 475 (“Consequently, an economy is not
composed of markets on the one hand and non-market exchange situations on the
other, but may include a variety of exchange situations from wholly unstructured sin-
gular exchanges at one end of the spectrum, through to ‘idealtypical’ markets at the
other.”).
45. Rosenbaum places various canonical non-markets at the opposite poles of
each criterion: firms, central planning, casual exchange, and gifts. Id.
46. See id. at 479.
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objects are each judged anew for their unique utilities. Similarly, one
could relax only regularity: maybe a world of revolving beanie-baby-
like fads, boom and bust. Or competitiveness, where there is some
competition but where a lot of the best goods go to well-connected
people at heavily discounted prices without ever “coming on the
market.”
Even though I do not adopt it for this analysis, the multidimen-
sional approach helps illustrate the diversity of institutional forms that
might commonly be called markets and, most critically, the diversity
of mechanisms for achieving institutional purposes. My effort in this
Article is more general: analyzing the legal segregation of institutions
by forbidding exchange of what gives rise to power within each of
them. Some institutions that interact and will be of interest to us fall
quite far from the edges of the dimensions that Rosenbaum associates
with markets. Nonetheless, the law must take account of them. A
more inclusive concept than proximity to impersonal exchange is
needed.
B. The School of Discrete Spheres
Rather than choosing to make a conceptual distinction between
markets and non-market cooperation, we could instead understand all
social decisionmaking structures as possessing internal power distribu-
tions that determine the decisions they make. After all, a legislature
uses equally distributed votes and persuasion according to certain
norms to reach discrete decisions, and an ice-cream vendor and its
customers use cash and bilateral transactions to distribute a supply of
ice cream. Both are instances of decisionmaking, and both are social.
And importantly, both involve individuals using power they maintain
within the institution to affect the institutional decision.
Viewing institutions as decisionmaking entities paired with internal,
power-distributing rules will indeed be the approach I adopt here. At
this general a level, however, it is not an entirely novel way of perceiv-
ing our social world. Distributive justice theorists in various disciplines
have cast markets as part of a broader institutional universe composed
of separate “spheres” of distribution and power. Michael Walzer is the
most well-known proponent of this description, from which he gener-
ated an associated theory of justice.47 The spheres of Walzer’s model
each distribute “different goods to different companies of men and
women for different reasons and in accordance with different
procedures.”48
In Walzer’s landmark typology, there are three primary distributive
principles—free exchange, desert, and need—that he argues under-
write the criteria used in the various spheres of social decisionmak-
47. See generally WALZER, supra note 1.
48. Id. at 26.
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ing.49 His project was to advance a new and ingenious theory of
distributive justice. Eschewing a lumped-together form of strict equal-
ity or Rawlsian maximin, Walzer defined a principle of “complex
equality,” under which “no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with
regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some
other sphere, with regard to some other good.”50
While the primary inquiry in this Article is not directly concerned
with a theory of distributive justice, the descriptive side of Walzer’s
normative argument—“different goods to different companies of men
and women for different reasons and in accordance with different pro-
cedures”—is compatible with the description here.51 The social world
is an overlapping set of decisionmaking institutions, all with their own
purposes and procedures tuned to those purposes.
Other scholars have similarly dissolved the market/non-market dis-
tinction to see many more institutional shades. Jon Elster, for exam-
ple, has built a typology of allocative techniques and justifications
from empirical observations of the distribution of various goods, such
as kidneys, the burden of military service, and education.52 And soci-
ologists Luc Boltanski and Laurent The´venot have described “six dif-
ferent frameworks of justification: civic, market, inspired, fame,
industrial, and domestic, which each contains their own principles of
evaluation. . . . [A]s a justificatory framework the market is constantly
in conflict with other established ideologies and social norms.”53 In-
deed, this way of understanding the social world, as composed of sepa-
rate domains, goes back to Max Weber and almost certainly beyond.54
Mapping these domains and charting their characteristics is a field
of active research. Ben Wempe and Jeff Frooman have examined vari-
ous social domains, charted their identification by other theorists,
mapped between various social values and compatible allocation
mechanisms, and suggested how these variables should be related.55 In
the domain of healthcare, for example, Wempe and Frooman identify
49. Id. at 21–26.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 26.
52. See generally JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE: HOW INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE
SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY BURDENS (1992).
53. Kari Karppinen & Hallvard Moe, What We Talk About When We Talk About
“The Market”: Conceptual Contestation in Contemporary Media Policy Research, 4 J.
INFO. POL’Y 327, 333–34 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (discussing LUC BOLTANSKI &
LAURENT THE´VENOT, ON JUSTIFICATION: ECONOMIES OF WORTH (2006)).
54. See, e.g., Ben Wempe & Jeff Frooman, Reframing the Moral Limits of Markets
Debate: Social Domains, Values, Allocation Methods, 153 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 5 (2016)
(“Weber’s conceptualizing of the various social domains may, in turn, have ultimately
been related to the distinction between a public and private sphere in ancient Greek
philosophy.”) (citing MAX WEBER, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Direc-
tions, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 326 (Hans Heinrich Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds., 2012)).
55. Wempe & Frooman, supra note 54, at 5–11.
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values of need, equality, and, subordinately, efficiency. They then ar-
gue these values give rise to certain compatible allocation techniques,
applying them to the problem of the supply of kidneys for
transplantation.56
The discrete spheres approach can enliven us to the reality that so-
cial decisionmaking occurs simultaneously in different aspects of our
social lives and according to very different methods. However, its em-
phasis on discretization may rely too strongly on the supposed sepa-
rateness of domains and on the existence of unitary social meanings
within domains to advance an analysis of segregation. Indeed, some
recent scholarship has questioned the focus on discrete distributive
principles within discrete spheres, recognizing that real societies do
not maintain only one method of provision per good.57 Rutger Claas-
sen notes that Walzer’s, and others’, principles of distribution do not
follow from an exhaustive taxonomic theory but seem drawn instead
from conventional understandings, and so any constraints on alloca-
tion such principles entail may be as arbitrarily drawn as the principles
themselves.58 And, within spheres, we often observe multiple means
of distribution and attitudes toward distribution.59
Instead of the usual spheres approach of identifying a shared social
meaning of the good in question and then matching a distributive
method with that meaning,60 Claassen argues for what he calls “com-
plex pluralism,” in which multiple modes of provision are analyzed for
how they jointly achieve ends that are themselves justified.61 For ex-
ample, public education exists alongside private education, with, at
some level of generality, many of the same practices and purposes at-
tributed to each. Healthcare, massages, food preparation, jokes, and
so many other social activities span separate domains within which
alternative currencies of power operate. Our account of a society’s
global norms of distribution of power must therefore describe a com-
plex sea of interacting institutions, some distributing similar, if not
identical, goods. It must further face up to the reality that whether, for
example, one sees “an educational system,” separate public and pri-
vate systems, individual school districts, or single classrooms as the
units of analysis is a choice of perspective, not an authoritative
description of some underlying reality.
56. Id. at 9–10.
57. See, e.g., Rutger J.G. Claassen, Institutional Pluralism and the Limits of the
Market, 8 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 420 (2009).
58. Id. at 422.
59. Id. at 426.
60. Id. at 428.
61. Id. at 428–35. For Claassen, these ends are measured by an agent-capability
theory. Id. at 430–31.
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C. The Institutional Models Approach
Disagreeing in the abstract about the meaning of a word is plainly
ridiculous. This will not be an argument about what a market “really
is.” Nor am I driven, as the strong market-ontologists are, to isolate
particular, exchange-based institutions for separate analysis. Rather,
with the school of discrete spheres, I observe that decisionmaking in-
stitutions that are stable, price-governed, and exchange-based are only
one type among a broader family of collective decisionmaking struc-
tures. Moreover, institutions that reach decisions by aggregating and
ratifying individual exchanges and institutions that reach decisions by,
say, voting, are often more similar in their internal power dynamics
than the labels they bear suggest.
Appreciating the larger set of institutions that reach decisions based
on some evolution of internal power dynamics will illuminate how
regulations stitch institutions together or rend them apart. But unlike
the school of discrete spheres, I do not see isolated spheres but a web
of institutions maintaining separate rules of both power usage and in-
ter-institutional power exchange. That web’s information-exchanging
institutions are neither fundamental nor ontologically separate.
Rather, they are merely perceived, or modeled, as such, depending on
the purposes and perspective of the perceiver.62
Indeed, the very same activities can be understood as occurring
within institutions of different scales. And so, we can consider the
market for consumer goods, the market for televisions, or only the
market for large-screen televisions. We can analyze the market for
House of Representative bills, the market for congressionally passed
legislation, or the market for federal legislation. All of these markets,
at their varying scales, are potential objects of analysis, capable of
study when they are modeled at a particular level of detail and in rela-
tion to adjacent decisionmakers.
I begin with my own definitions of the following terms:
• Institutions are cooperating groups of people that, given a ques-
tion, apply some reasons and produce outputs.
• Markets are institutions but viewed with their internal power
structures. That is, a market is a conceptual object that consists
of both an institution and a representation of the power its con-
62. This approach bears some similarity to Luhmann’s theory of organizations as
social forms constituted by decision communications. For Luhmann, organizations
only exist as decision communications, and they therefore are constantly producing
and reproducing themselves. Critically, these decisions, like all communications for
Luhmann, require interpretation (or understanding) to exist. See, e.g., David Seidl &
Hannah Mormann, Niklas Luhmann as Organization Theorist, in OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIOLOGY, SOCIAL THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: CONTEMPO-
RARY CURRENTS 137–40 (2014). But I am not yet prepared to explore the deeper
connections with Luhmann’s work.
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stituent entities possess to affect the institution’s decisional
output.
FIGURE 1.
One could begin from a different perspective, perhaps describing
decisionmaking institutions as possessing explicit or implicit voting
rules, rules for recognition and governance of agents, due process
rules of various sorts, and other attributes—all of which would sound
in a public register. Under this view, even ordinary economic markets
are composed of “legislatures” whose members “vote” with dollars.
After all, private contracting parties write binding law and submit to a
constitutional law of structure and rights, the body of law we teach as
“contract law.” We just call that law by different names than that
which governs institutions we locate in the public sphere.63
We gain a different set of insights into cooperation by instead look-
ing through the other end of the scope and characterizing decision-
making institutions by their recognition of currencies of power, their
rules of currency exchange, and other attributes that sound in a pri-
vate, market-like register. The “market” approach to understanding
the sea of overlapping cooperative structures of society is just that, an
approach. It is a way of understanding cooperation, not a special cate-
gory of cooperation.
I propose the following features, or types of rules, as sufficiently
descriptive and distinguishing to characterize decisionmaking struc-
tures at the level of analysis at which law typically engages: (1) cur-
rency definition, (2) decision rules, (3) redistribution rules, (4) rules
concerning secondary influence markets, and (5) currency exchange
rules. Identifying these rules within a market generates an external
description, meaning one concerned with objective features that ex-
plain to an observer how a market functions. An internal description
would focus, instead, on the purposes and compromises that have
drawn the participants together and have led them to organize in this
way.
63. See Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1003, 1033–42 (2012) (explaining the symmetry between the secondary rules that gov-
ern the making of public and private laws). The rule recognizing a validly made law in
the public sphere focuses on legislator identity and legislative procedure. In contracts,
it is voluntary agreement among those who will be bound (unanimity rather than
majoritarianism). Id. Viewed this way, the legal system’s rules of recognition, whether
for publicly or privately created laws, are tuned to the types of laws we wish various
institutions to make and to policing for the problems institutions typically have.
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The table below suggests some options for each type of rule. Let us
consider each type in turn and in greater detail.
TABLE 1.
Rule Type Examples of Options 
Currency Definition Explicit or implicit 
Decision Rules Threshold or continuous, disaggregated or 
centralized 
Redistribution Rules Temporal dimension (never, delayed, 
immediate, continuous, or discrete); degree 
(none, partial, discrete) 
Secondary Influence 
Market Regulations 
Bans, limitations, registration and 
identification, laissez faire 
Currency Exchange 
Rules 
None, dyadic, hermetic 
1. Currency Definition
One thing an institution’s constitutive rules must do, whether writ-
ten or not, is to provide a method to assess the kind and amount of
power that individuals possess to affect the group’s decisions. Such
rules can range from an explicit one-person, one-vote rule to rules
that are usually described as protecting private property and recogniz-
ing binding exchanges of that property. The electorate for a local rep-
resentative and the members of a democratic legislature are examples
of the former. Participants in a local real estate market, buying and
selling lands and buildings, are examples of the latter. Both institu-
tions assign power to individuals and recognize valid evolutions of the
distribution of that power. Thus, each market contains a “currency,”
though of different types, and rules for the use of those currencies.
Currencies, as I conceive them, are conceptual objects employed by
a modeler of instances of cooperation. They are not necessarily dis-
crete symbols of power recognized from the internal point of view of a
market participant. Nonetheless, each such participant does in fact
maintain some power, some ability to affect (if not effect) a decision,
and that power is either explicitly represented (in capital or voting
share, for example) or at least is potentially representable and thus
susceptible to external representation as an imputed currency (per-
haps as an externally gauged measure of influence).
In markets that use money to allocate goods, the currency of power
is obvious. The more money one has, the greater the ability actually to
effect a distribution that is consistent with one’s preferences. Similarly
obvious is the currency in many legislative markets, the vote that can
be cast for or against a proposal. In less formal decisionmaking
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groups, the currency may have to be inferred, its being only a model
of more diffuse allocations of power. Perhaps in groups that appear to
operate by consensus, complex power arrangements based on senior-
ity and prior achievements in fact drive decisions, and we could en-
deavor to model the distribution of such power. In markets for judicial
decisions, judges have a sort of monopoly and are sole possessors of
currency. Yes, they are subject to the influence of lawyers and to criti-
cism by other judges and the public. In other words, how they choose
to deploy their power is influenced by the use of power in other mar-
kets. But we will take separate account, infra, of these secondary in-
fluence markets, the markets that influence how actors within a target
market use the currency they possess.
2. Decision Rules
Any group action must be undertaken or implicitly approved by the
group. Its rules governing actions and approvals are decision rules.
Will there be a vote taken by all or only by some? Is there only one
vote, or are there several layers of voting? Is the decision of a single
member or some subset of members adopted automatically as the de-
cision of the group, under some empirical conditions that must be
found, as with private contracts? What behaviors by an individual will
be required to manifest a decision by that individual?
The decision rules and the currency are related in that such rules
define the currency’s implications. Even if the currency exists as some
physical object or is otherwise defined empirically, rules determine
how its members recognize its use and how they justify decisions
based on its use. In the market that distributes televisions in the
United States, dollars are the currency. But decisions—which goods
should be allocated to which people—are reached by certain behav-
iors with respect to that currency: namely a valid offer and acceptance
as further defined by a state’s contract law.64
3. Redistribution Rules
Suppose that participants, using some currency, reach a decision at
a particular moment—for example, on a particular date the allocation
of a certain good is what it is. What happens next? Some currency
regimes are conservative in time, defining the allocation of currency in
a manner that preserves the effects of the receipt and expenditure of
the currency. Others are highly redistributive and thus disruptive of
64. Note the fact that, for example, some televisions are bartered does not much
alter our satisfaction with a model of the television market that identifies dollars as
the currency of power. This is so because so long as there are sufficiently numerous
exchanges, the things bartered have a dollar value. Therefore, when analyzing the
market, it will probably suffice to understand the distribution of dollars and rules for
exchange in order to understand the market’s evolution.
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their currency distributions, for example allocating currency anew af-
ter each decision.
Ordinary markets in consumer goods that use dollars as currency
are examples of currency-conserving markets. Each valid exchange is
recognized by the community as binding, and the movement of cur-
rency that effected the exchange is preserved. Taxation and public
spending are the primary methods by which the distribution of cur-
rency is adjusted.65
In contrast, the market that produces the decisions of public legisla-
tures uses the currency of a vote, and each unit of currency is confis-
cated and redistributed equally after every discrete decision. Note that
these are just examples and that the potential for hybrids is one rea-
son to take a more general point of view. Suppose a legislature
worked by allocating one hundred votes to each member, each term.
One could vote or not vote on each matter. Maybe a legislator is al-
lowed only one vote on each matter, maybe more than one. Perhaps
votes could be exchanged in some fashion. And only after the term
would the remaining, unused votes be confiscated and then redis-
tributed in the next term.66 Whether explicitly designed or inferred
from observations of norms in action, currencies and their redistribu-
tion can be complex.
4. Secondary Influence Markets
For every individual with some power to affect a decision, there
may be others interested in a decisional outcome and who wish to
influence how that power is used. Advertising is an appeal to a con-
sumer to use currency to direct resources to the production of the ad-
vertiser’s goods or services. Each dollar spent on those goods is a vote
for the advertiser’s production as against other group efforts. Lobby-
ing, campaign advertising, lawyering: all of these are efforts to change
65. For purposes of simplicity, I am glossing over the many ways a modern econ-
omy affects the value of fixed quanta of currency. See, e.g., Jane E. Ihrig, Ellen E.
Meade & Gretchen C. Weinbach, Monetary Policy 101: A Primer on the Fed’s Chang-
ing Approach to Policy Implementation, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-047
(June 20, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.047 [https://perma.cc/H4SM-
LNRZ].
66. Decisions in the workplace governing which employees can take vacation time
and when are often of this hybrid type. Federal government employees, for example,
earn paid vacation days, a unit of currency capable of unilateral use, but some of these
units are confiscated annually. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., Fact Sheet: Annual Leave
(General Information), at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/leave-
administration/fact-sheets/annual-leave/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
6XRR-FWJY]. Employees may even donate leave to fellow employees who satisfy
the conditions to become valid recipients. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., Fact Sheet:
Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-
leave/leave-administration/fact-sheets/voluntary-leave-transfer-program/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2PCE-ABWW].
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the mind of a decisionmaker and redirect the use of his or her
currency.
I use the term secondary influence market to refer to a market that
produces information intended to affect the spending of currency in
another market.
FIGURE 2.
It is possible that a market’s participants are so susceptible to the
efforts of a secondary influence market effort that the market and its
secondary influence market are analytically indistinguishable, the de-
cisions of the former resulting entirely from efforts in the latter. If this
is so, we can model the market’s decisionmaking solely by analyzing
the dynamics of the influence market.
This is the critique often given of our system of campaign finance,67
and political campaigning is difficult to distinguish from other forms
of marketing.68 The outcome of an election may turn not on the deci-
sion reached through the spending of the electorate’s highly redistrib-
utive and relatively currency-equal votes but through the spending of
rival and unequally distributed dollars to vie for the attention of such
voters.69 In such a case, even if votes cannot be paid for directly,70 the
67. See, e.g., ROBERT REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW
11–12 (2015) (discussing the influence money has over politics under current law).
68. See, e.g., Norman Peng & Chris Hackley, Are Voters Consumers? A Qualitative
Exploration of the Voter-Consumer Analogy in Political Marketing, 12 QUALITATIVE
MKT. RES. 171, 173–76 (2009) (reviewing the marketing and political science litera-
ture comparing voters and consumers as marketing audiences).
69. The evidence concerning the extent to which this occurs is mixed and fascinat-
ing. Some studies support a connection between spending and persuasion (at least on
some types of issues), some between spending and turnout, and some no connection
at all. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, Campaign Finance: A Review and an Assessment
of the State of the Literature, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC CHOICE 415,
418–21 (Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, & Stefan Voigt, eds., Oxford Uni-
320 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
influence market is causally connected with the decisionmaking mar-
ket. Despite the formal segregation of the dollar-connected markets
from the electoral market, the currency of the influence market, the
dollar, can effectively be spent to influence election decisions.
5. Currency Exchange and Segregation Rules
Markets organize their currency rules and distributions differently,
and one immediate family of questions concerns whether and how
power in one market should be exchangeable with power in another,
whether a market should be structured simply to mirror the power
structure of another, or whether a market’s power distribution should
be causally walled off from another’s. The consumer market in cars in
the United States is nearly completely connected to the market in
televisions. They use a common currency, dollars, and there are no
obvious rules prohibiting the use of currency gained in one from af-
fecting the functioning of the other. Note that this could be otherwise:
if circumstances demanded, we could issue car coupons that are for-
bidden to be bought, sold, or exchanged for television coupons.
One reason it makes sense, though, to connect these markets seam-
lessly is that the production of consumer goods is rival and so a deci-
sion to produce more televisions ultimately comes at the expense of
the capacity to produce more cars.71 And there is no pressing social
reason to prefer a particular allocation of productive effort between
them. The capacity of each might be expanded at the expense of the
other, just as with all other connected markets, and, most importantly,
we are happy with this dynamic. Individual consumers wishing to di-
versity Press 2019); Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive
Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experi-
ments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 148 (2018) (finding no effect of political
campaigning and advertising on voter choice among candidates in general elections);
Ryan D. Enos & Anthony Fowler, Aggregate Effects of Large-Scale Campaigns on
Voter Turnout, 6 POL. SCI. & RES. METHODS 733, 733–35 (2016) (finding evidence
that national campaigns can substantially increase turnout and that the mechanism is
primarily in the form of “canvassing, phone calls, and direct mail,” with little dimin-
ishing return for increasing such efforts). My effort here is to consider attitudes to-
ward segregation in light of mismatches between a market’s purpose and those to
which it is connected. Whether to segregate ordinary markets from the market for
campaigning depends a great deal on just how effective campaign markets are,
whatever the mechanism by which they might be. For now, I note only that markets
secondary to electoral markets exist and that a widespread assumption among voters
is that they have substantial effects on the nature of the resulting representation. See,
e.g., Rebecca L. Brown & Andrew D. Martin, Rhetoric and Reality: Testing the Harm
of Campaign Spending, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1066, 1089–91 (2015).
70. A bar on direct payment is a segregation rule preventing the use of power in
all the dollar-connected markets in the electoral market. See infra Section III.B.
71. Of course, other production may fall at the expense of both.
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rect their own limited resources should, we have concluded, mediate
the devotion of social resources to these efforts in a Hayekian way.72
The dynamic, depicted in the figure below, is one in which power
obtained in one market, for example by successfully satisfying televi-
sion acquisition preferences, can be easily exchanged for power to in-
fluence allocation in the car market. Between the two efforts is a
currency exchange, turning television power into car power as if be-
tween U.S. dollars and euros. By using exactly the same physical cur-
rency, this exchange is perhaps as low a transaction cost method of
coupling the markets as can be imagined.
FIGURE 3.
Institution / Market
Institution / Market
Issue:
What and how 
many TVs, to 
whom?
Issue:
What and how 
many cars, to 
whom?
There are other instances, though, in which free currency exchange
not only fails to serve a market’s purpose but thwarts it. I will consider
such examples in more detail in what follows. But an obvious one is a
decision to connect the market for luxury automobiles (in which the
widely exchanged dollar is the unit of decisional power) with the mar-
ket for criminal adjudication (in which a judge and jury have been
allocated detailed but circumscribed power over the decision). The
very purpose of the market design in criminal adjudication is contrary
to the incentives and allocation purposes in the market for cars, and so
we have rules of judicial ethics, criminal bribery laws, and trial proce-
72. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526–27
(1945) (describing how the price system aggregates and transmits information from
individual participants to adjust production and consumption without any single deci-
sionmaker’s needing to be conscious of the underlying patterns of availability and
demand).
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dures that absolutely forbid currency exchange between these two
markets.73
In the figure below, we can visualize that forbidding currency ex-
change between the markets (the central no-entry sign), decouples the
markets’ decisionmaking (the rightmost no-entry sign). The institu-
tional decision reached in the first market does not respond to power
dynamics in the second.74
FIGURE 4.
Institution / Market
Institution / Market
Issue:
What and how 
many cars, to 
whom?
Issue:
How to resolve a 
dispute?
Judge / Jury
D. Summary
A currency is a representation of power to induce others to join in
effecting a collective decision. Dollars can be used to cause another to
manifest the voluntariness that the collective deems sufficient to real-
locate a good by contract. Dollars could also be used to induce an-
other to join a voting coalition. So too, promised affection could be
73. See, e.g., 2C GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 620.15, https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/vol02c-ch06.pdf (last updated Dec. 14, 2010) [https://perma.cc/
2VR8-93Q8] (discussing the prohibition of gifts to the judicial branch); see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 92 (2014) (making bribes to judicial officers punishable by imprison-
ment for two to four years).
74. In a remarkable article on the concept of bribery, Deborah Hellman identifies
exchange across spheres of value as the critical fact bearing on our intuitions concern-
ing the wrongfulness of political (and even familial) bribery. Deborah Hellman, A
Theory of Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1971–72 (2017). But, even more inter-
estingly and consistent with the institutional models approach I advance here,
Hellman notes that determining spheres of value, and thus normative reasoning about
exchange, is a social process, and the identification of these spheres is thus empirical.
Id. at 1977–79.
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used, a potentially less rival sort of power, and perhaps less certain an
inducement. A legislature has a currency of votes, which is rival by
rule and reset after each vote to the initial, equal allocation. It has, as
do consumer markets, thriving influence markets, both internal lobby-
ing (where committee assignments, better offices, and promises of fu-
ture coalitions influence vote spending) and external lobbying.
With these definitions and observations, a defense of my broad un-
derstanding of markets is apparent. It is helpful to use the same term
“market” to describe these various institutions, despite their very dif-
ferent currencies and purposes, because people in fact attempt to ex-
change currencies across them all the time. There is surely a
connectedness among nearly all markets, from financial derivatives to
marriage. And even standard-issue economic markets of the sort we
intuitively assume are and should be connected might have slightly
different purposes from one another.75 So the desire to disconnect and
segregate markets is sometimes obvious and primary, and it is some-
times subtler. But much confusion arises from thinking of the various
decisionmaking structures as totally different in kind and incompara-
ble. It is better to see what their differences actually are and to see our
choice whether to connect or segregate them in light of these differ-
ences if our goal is to understand the larger system.
Public choice theory, for example, arises from the analysis of politi-
cal institutions as if they were markets operating under many of the
same principles as private, competitive markets.76 I want to examine
society not as markets and other, different things that operate in some
ways like markets—but as comprising overlapping collections of deci-
sionmaking markets, all governed by internal and external laws that
bind them together or divide them.
III. SOME EXAMPLES
I now explore two examples of markets that have been the target of
segregation efforts. They have aroused controversy in seemingly dis-
parate social settings: the financing of political campaigns in the
United States and the market for star players in European football.
75. Consider on the one hand markets in critical goods, like food, that are more
likely subject to direct regulation in the face of dangerous scarcity and on the other
hand markets in luxury goods that would proceed by normal exchange even if cut off
from, say, food markets by a dangerous famine. This is to say nothing of the lesser
forms of intrusion that control the use of resources within a market, governing
thereby the rates and purposes of currency exchange, much like national currency
controls, as in markets in housing subject to rent control. See, e.g., Daniel K. Fetter,
The Home Front: Rent Control and the Rapid Wartime Increase in Home Ownership,
76 J. ECON. HIST. 1001, 1007–10 (2016) (describing the World War II-era federal rent
control regulations, their purpose, and some resulting conversion by landlords, from
one type of good, rental housing, to another, owner-occupied housing).
76. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285–94 (1988).
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The lesson here is that the sort of abstraction that the institutional
model of markets provides will help us to see the underlying similarity
of the problems in these markets, typical responses to those problems,
and problems with those responses.
The generic story goes like this. In each market, one can identify the
market’s point or purpose, even if there is not full agreement on the
particularities of that purpose. Power accumulated in external markets
characteristically interferes with that purpose when deployed directly
to further the preferences of the one who wields it. Segregation efforts
attempt to disarm such an individual, subjecting him or her primarily
to the market’s internally drawn rules of power accumulation and ren-
dering useless power accumulated elsewhere. There are downsides.
Formally closing the currency exchange between the internal market
and the forbidden external ones is subject to potentially destructive
loopholes or black-market exchanges. Furthermore, the less available
currency exchange is, the more important the redistributive logic and
justifications are within the market. It is in this way that the segrega-
tion of a market favors the market’s incumbents. And so, while ideal
segregation would protect a market’s righteous purposes from exter-
nal attack, it would also protect a market’s corrupt purposes from ex-
ternal rescue. If normative contest would be beneficial, segregation is
counterproductive. This effect has been a key point of criticism of seg-
regation efforts in both the labor market in European football and the
campaign finance market in U.S. national elections. In general, then,
we find segregation urged to protect a market’s normative logic. Crit-
ics cite two characteristic problems: (a) black-market leakage and (b)
undesirable protection of incumbents. Let us start with the market
that may be less familiar, the football labor market.
A. Financial Fair Play
1. A Rough Description of European Football Leagues
and Federations
Compared to those of many professional sports leagues in the
United States, European football federations’ labor markets resemble
ordinary free markets to a far greater degree.77 The competing and
independent clubs associate with one another rather than operating as
entities within a more singular corporate umbrella.78 For example,
77. See Richard C.K. Burdekin & Michael Franklin, Transfer Spending in the En-
glish Premier League: The Haves and the Have Nots, NAT’L INST. ECON. REV., May
2015, at R4, R7–R8 (2015) (“There is no counterpart to the revenue sharing measures
seen in all the major US sports leagues and the Premier League operates more like a
free market . . . .”).
78. A fascinating description of the history and current state of English football’s
league structures, inter-league and intra-league regulations as compared to most
American sports is given in STEFAN SZYMANSKI AND ANDREW ZIMBALIST, NATIONAL
PASTIME: HOW AMERICANS PLAY BASEBALL AND THE REST OF THE WORLD PLAYS
SOCCER, ch. 4–5 (2005).
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clubs contract directly with players, and this often entails bargaining
with other clubs across the world to release players from existing con-
tracts.79 On the income side, clubs earn their money in more tradi-
tional entrepreneurial terms rather than within a franchise system or a
system of unitary ownership.80
Clubs’ relative financial and decisionmaking independence creates
the possibility that financially successful clubs will become dominant
in sporting terms by outbidding other clubs for the best players, which
in turn could bring more financial success, and so on in an ever-deep-
ening cycle. Indeed, smaller clubs cannot compete with financial might
of Europe’s titans, like Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester City,
Bayern Munich, or PSG.81 But independence creates opportunities for
wealthy individuals to inject large amounts of cash to create an in-
stantly competitive team.82 Examples in recent years in England in-
clude Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich’s purchase and
transformation of Chelsea F.C. and the purchase of Manchester City
F.C. by multi-billionaire Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan.83
If we view the labor market in football from the more abstract van-
tage point of the institutions model, it might cause us to wonder what
the purposes of this market are and whether its various currency ex-
changes interfere with those purposes. From the perspective of the
federation, the purpose of competitive football is to maximize joint
profits, with each club an asset or investment. Some owners, however,
view their clubs more as articles of consumption rather than invest-
ment. They are win-maximizing rather than profit-maximizing.84 Even
if one is cynical about modern sports, it would be naı¨ve not to recog-
79. See, e.g., Andi Thomas, The European Soccer Transfer Market, Explained,
SBNATION (July 28, 2014, 11:02 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/7/28/
5923187/transfer-window-soccer-europe-explained [https://perma.cc/SMF6-8E4V]
(“Here’s how a basic transfer works. Club 1 has a player. Club 2 wants a player. Club
2 and Club 1 thrash out an agreeable price, the player and Club 2 thrash out some
agreeable wages, and then the transfer happens—the player’s registration is trans-
ferred from Club 1 to Club 2, and he signs a new contract . . . .”).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., CALUM ROSS ET AL., DELOITTE FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE 9
(2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/sports-busi
ness-group/deloitte-uk-deloitte-football-money-league-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CX86-5PLQ]. The revenue of each of these teams in the 2017–2018 season was about
three times that of West Ham United, which, as the twentieth highest grossing team in
Europe, itself earned more than nearly all other European clubs. Id.
82. See Burdekin & Franklin, supra note 77, at R8.
83. Id. at R5.
84. Owners, of course, may exist along a spectrum from pure profit-maximization
to potentially ruinous win-maximization.
The optimization problem facing the sportsman owner concerns the joint
maximization of franchise value and the satisfaction derived from winning.
The sportsman owner sacrifices franchise value for winning and expands the
talent of his club beyond its value maximum. The resulting undervaluation of
the franchise is the sportsman effect. In the limit, sportsman owners become
win-maximizers, who are only constrained by zero profit.
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nize that many participants likely have at least some (and wish to
demonstrate a great deal of a) spirit of fair play and desire for sporting
glory. In sum, the motivations of the market’s actors and their joint
purposes may seem peculiar next to those of participants in, say, com-
modities markets. While it may not be entirely uniform, there is a set
here of distinctive purposes against which the market’s design can be
measured.
2. Key Market Attributes
Let us focus on the market for football players in the terms we have
developed thus far. The clubs are buyers, and the players are sellers.
Once a player has a labor contract with a club, another club wishing to
acquire the player must secure agreement with both the selling club
and the selling player to effect a transfer.85 But should that be
enough? Should there be other restrictions the league places on trans-
fers to achieve its purposes, including those of promoting entertaining
competition and the overall financial soundness of the league? This is,
at bottom, a basic constitutional question concerning how the league
decides to allocate players and deploy its resources to induce people
to become players. Perhaps, for example, a league could conclude
there should be limits on what a club can pay for a player. More gen-
erally, a league must decide what sort of decisionmaking power indi-
vidual clubs should have in the ultimate decision regarding the
distribution of players.
These structural decisions concerning player allocation are not with-
out constraint from outside the market. Because players are free peo-
ple and must be induced to play football, the structure as a whole
must offer something to players that they can exchange in the seam-
lessly connected consumption markets at a level that exceeds (when
combined with their inherent satisfaction with football itself) all other
known opportunities. That is, players need something from this mar-
ket that can be used to acquire money in ordinary consumption mar-
kets. The most obvious candidate for such a thing is money itself.
But the conclusion that the allocation decision regarding players
and clubs must ultimately result in payment of money to players does
not require that clubs pay that money, nor does it tell us whether the
money paid to players should come from club or league resources.
Some American leagues, for example, have a shared salary pool or
such severe restrictions on what clubs can offer that labor contracting
can be seen as a joint effort.86
John Vrooman, Sportsman Leagues, 62 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 90, 91 (2015) (quot-
ing Vrooman, A Unified Theory of Capital and Labor Markets in MLB, 63 SOUTHERN
ECON. J. 594, 596 (1997)).
85. See Thomas, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Dennis Coates, Bernd Frick, & Todd Jewell, Superstar Salaries and
Soccer Success: The Impact of Designated Players in Major League Soccer, 17 J.
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The European solution is, at least in overall form, the standard con-
tract one. Clubs profit from their activities, and they pay money to
players to help them generate further profits. This seems simple
enough. Clubs earn money in various markets, including television
rights, shirt sales, gate receipts, prize money, and the owners’ personal
resources.87 They use this money to buy players in the player mar-
ket.88 So far, we have what seems to be a labor market that is seam-
lessly connected to other markets by sharing the currency of
traditional money. To the extent there are any internal redistributive
taxes and transfers, they arise chiefly from collective television
rights.89 One way to see such contracts is as payments from popular
and profitable clubs to other clubs that could not, on their own, nego-
tiate television rights revenue to the degree it is distributed to them by
the league.
In terms of our model, the generic European football labor market
has the following form:
TABLE 2.
Rule Type The Market for Players in European Football 
Currency Definition Cash 
Decision Rules Dyadic agreement between clubs and 
between club and player 
Redistribution Rules Weak, some redistributive sharing of 
television revenue 
Secondary Influence 
Market Regulations 
None 
Currency Exchange 
Rules 
None 
Given that the league’s product is competitive entertainment, it is in
the league’s interest that teams are able to compete on at least a
SPORTS ECON. 716, 719–24 (2016) (describing the salary scheme of Major League Soc-
cer, the dominant league in the United States, as team-level salary capped, with an
exception permitting each team a given number of “designated players” that can be
awarded very high salaries but which salaries are charged against a team’s salary cap
at a fixed, lower amount).
87. See ROSS ET AL., supra note 81, at 2.
88. See Thomas, supra note 79.
89. See, e.g., Premier League, Premier League Value of Central Payments to Clubs
2017/18 (May 17, 2018), https://www.premierleague.com/news/691073 [https://perma
.cc/36TT-MWW7] (detailing the sharing of television revenue among UK Premier
League clubs, with significant equalization among clubs); see also David Conn, Pre-
mier League’s Top Six Win Battle for Larger Share of Overseas TV Rights, GUARDIAN
(June 7, 2018, 7:06 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/jun/07/pre
mier-league-big-six-win-battle-overseas-television-rights [https://perma.cc/5FWL-
SGUB].
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somewhat even footing. While dynasties and popular teams may actu-
ally increase fan interest, leagues that are not at all competitive will
generally underperform financially.90 If internal redistribution rules
are weak, outsized injections of capital from external sources might
harm a league’s general purposes.
3. UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations91
The free labor markets of European football created two perceived
problems, each of which posed a danger of cascading into further
problems. First, many clubs, and many well-known clubs, racked up
high debts, a large portion of which was from transfer fees and player
salaries.92 Second, fans and football officials objected to “financial
doping,” the injection of large amounts of capital generated outside
football by wealthy owners.93
On the first point, Egon Franck documents factors that cause even
rational, profit-oriented clubs to gamble on success and thus over-
invest in players.94 But rather than creating an arms race, football ex-
periences a “zombie race,” in which clubs overspend to remain
competitive but are not subject to the ordinary threat of dissolution,
because they are kept alive by creditors’ reticence to call in debts,
government support, and infusions from wealthy owners.95 The league
may be entertaining, but its participants are the walking dead,
financially.
90. See, e.g., STEFAN SZYMANSKI, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: WHY A SPORTS
LEAGUE PLANNER WOULD CHOOSE LESS, NOT MORE, COMPETITIVE BALANCE 31–33
(London: Tanaka Bus. Sch. ed., 2005) (suggesting that regular rotation of dominant
teams would help balance fan interest and annual attendance).
91. UEFA, the Union of European Football Associations, is, as its name suggests,
an organization that governs international competitions in Europe and administers
some of the most prestigious competitions in European football, including the UEFA
Champions League. See Oliver Budzinski, The Competition Economics of Financial
Fair Play 1–2 (Ilmenau Econ. Discussion Papers vol. 19 no. 85, 2014) (describing the
structure of European leagues and UEFA’s role as a “market-internal regulatory
agency enjoying a monopoly position”).
92. Tom Serby, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations: The Devil is in the Detail,
5 GLOBAL SPORTS L. & TAX REP. 6, 6 (2014); see also Egon Franck, Financial Fair
Play in European Club Football: What is it All About? 9 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 193,
196–202 (2014) (explaining the link between financial instability and public and pri-
vate subsidies for risky financial management in sports leagues).
93. See Ariela Caglio et al., Does Fair Play Matter? UEFA Regulation and Finan-
cial Sustainability in the European Football Industry 4, 6 (Ctr. for Applied Research
on Int’l Mkts., Banking, Fin. & Regulation, Working Paper No. 2016-38, 2016) (ex-
plaining financial doping and sugar daddies).
94. See Franck, supra note 92, at 196 (pointing, inter alia, to exogenous prizes,
strong correlation between investment and winning, large revenue differentials be-
tween clubs within a league and among leagues in a promotion and relegation hierar-
chy, and competition formats).
95. See id. at 196–202.
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The second problem, not entirely distinct from the first but per-
ceived as a problem in its own right, is “financial doping.”96 “Doping”
is a term that means, in its most general sense, the introduction of a
foreign competitive advantage where it does not belong.97 A thing
should be decided on certain grounds, and doping is the injection of
other grounds into the system. “Financial doping” in sport, a phrase
coined by Arse`ne Wenger, longtime manager of the Arsenal Football
Club in England, means to suggest that money is somehow coming
into football from an external and improper source.98
In many markets, “doping” just does not seem to be a particularly
salient critique of allocation dynamics. It would be odd to suggest that
rich people engage in financial doping of the television market when
they purchase many televisions. Were their purchases so extensive
that they raised the prices of televisions and related goods to a point
that significantly affected the distribution of those goods, public con-
cern would likely center on the distribution of resources generally.
The difficulty in accessing televisions would then be a spark and a
salient example rather than the whole issue in itself. Of course, one
can imagine a world in which a cartel of rich consumers so corners the
television market that the polity reacts by segregating television distri-
bution from other markets. Yes, it is conceivable that a society might
issue television coupons. But this would likely arise only at the point
that distribution became so skewed that the thick layer of preference-
satisfaction justifications for market decisions was eroded to its core,
bearing in the open a basic question of whether the availability of this
good, here televisions, is important to the society. In football, where
there is more convergence around distinctively collective purposes
than there is in televisions, doping has a clear meaning: “Irrelevantly”
obtained power unilaterally skews the decisionmaking apparatus away
from those purposes.99
To combat these perceived problems, UEFA, Europe’s governing
football body, created new regulations on club finances, conditioning,
among other benefits, participation in prestigious pan-European com-
petitions on compliance.100 These so-called “financial fair play” regu-
lations are simple in concept. Clubs must not run deficits. In
particular, clubs must show that they “do not have overdue payables
towards other clubs, their players, [or] social/tax authorities through-
96. See generally Hywel Iorwerth, Paul Tomkins & Graham Riley, Financial Dop-
ing in the English Premier League, 12 SPORT ETHICS & PHIL. 272 (2018).
97. See id. at 281.
98. See id.
99. See J. Christian Mu¨ller, Joachim Lammert & Gregor Hovemann, The Finan-
cial Fair Play Regulations of UEFA: An Adequate Concept to Ensure the Long-Term
Viability and Sustainability of European Club Football?, 7 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 117,
123–24 (2012).
100. See id. at 118.
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out the season.”101 Further, and more importantly, clubs must show
that in the preceding three years they have a (nearly) net positive “in-
come from football related activities and expenditures.”102 In other
words, they must break even on footballing costs and revenues.
While this might sound like a purely financial regulation intended to
counteract some tragedy-of-the-commons-like market failure, the pur-
pose runs deeper. The key here is that the regulations require not just
a profit in general, but a surplus of allowable, or what UEFA calls
“relevant,” income.103 And the relevant income, that which must sum
to more than player salaries, transfer fees, and most other club costs,
is defined by UEFA as, basically, money paid ultimately by fans inter-
ested in football. So gate receipts, television rights, advertising rights,
prize money, and the like count as income for purposes of the rule.
Injections of cash from wealthy owners do not.104
The key effort of regulations like these is to leave in place, without
strengthening, the relatively weak redistributive systems of most do-
mestic leagues while at the same time imposing segregation rules, a
prohibition of currency exchange between the player labor market
and all markets except those related to a club’s footballing value. The
rules let a club’s player-buying power correlate with audience success.
Teams that earn greater viewership, more shirt sales, and better licens-
ing agreements are the ones with greater audience support. If the pur-
pose of the cooperation (the league) is to maximize such support, then
allocating players consistent with that support makes sense.
101. Serby, supra note 92, at 7–8.
102. Id. at 8.
103.  UEFA, CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, art. 60
§ 2 (2018) (“If a club’s relevant expenses are greater than relevant income for a re-
porting period, then it has a break-even deficit.”). See also Angelo D’Andrea & Do-
nato Masciandaro, Financial Fair Play in European Football: Economics and Political
Economy 3 (Baffi Carefin Ctr. for Applied Research on Int’l Mkts., Banking, Fin., &
Regulation, Working Paper No. 2016-15, 2016).
104. UEFA, supra note 103, at annex X(A) (defining “relevant income” as the sum
of gate receipts, sponsorships, broadcasting rights, commercial activities, UEFA “soli-
darity” and prize money, other operating income, player sales to other clubs, profits
from sales of tangible fixed assets, and “finance income” but excluding non-monetary
credits, transactions with “related party(ies) above fair value,” income from non-foot-
ball operations not related to the club, income from players signed with the club, and
bankruptcy-style protections from creditors). Expenses are similarly defined as “rele-
vant” or not in order to allow non-relevant injections of capital to finance, inter alia,
youth development, women’s football, and community development. Id.
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“Fair play” might also be construed as maintaining sporting compet-
itiveness among teams. If so, then continual and significant redistribu-
tion of profits, perhaps going as far as to turn all clubs into discrete
units of a single decisionmaking entity, might serve that purpose bet-
ter. But substantial redistribution, by splitting all television proceeds
equally, for example, could work against the “increasing audience sup-
port” purpose by skewing the allocation of players toward teams with
weaker audience support and contravene audience taste for dynas-
ties.105 So too could significant influxes of capital from sources unre-
lated to audience support hamper that purpose. A team with weaker
fan support but with a win-motivated owner awash in oil riches might
suddenly buy the best available players and curtail winning opportuni-
ties for the best-supported teams. Segregation of these markets at-
tempts to preserve the distinctive, if not perfectly defined, purposes of
the football league.
105. See, e.g., SZYMANSKI, supra note 90, at 31–33.
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There are, of course, obvious rejoinders. First, segregation will be of
little use or will unfairly burden those who comply if there is signifi-
cant black-market exchange, meaning the illicit transfer from forbid-
den external markets to the internal market. In European football,
many critics argue just this. For example, corporate entities, especially
those somehow related to a club’s owners, could overpay for stadium
naming rights or jersey advertisements, smuggling in cash to balance
the books.106 Money will respond to the hydraulic pressure applied by
those with the means and desire to transfer it where it is wanted.
Against this pressure, the resolve of the segregators will continually be
tested as smugglers search for new loopholes.
But even if black-market leakage or loopholes could be controlled,
the sudden infusion of success from a foreign currency exchange could
do two things: (1) create new fans or make existing fans more support-
ive, thus changing the distribution of fan support within the league,
and (2) increase the competitiveness of the league and drive more in-
terest than a league dominated by a few incumbents. These observa-
tions amount to an internal critique of segregation, that segregation
will in fact disserve the distinctive purposes of the league. Internal
critics of segregation characteristically argue that exposure to the mar-
ket’s internal rules without recourse to external power will unfairly
favor the market’s incumbents.107 In doing so, they identify a basic
106. See Patrick J. Sims, The Circumvention of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules
Through the Influx of Foreign Investments, 39 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 75–77
(2018).
107. See, e.g., Andrew Anthony, Football’s Fat Cats Have Ended Any Hope of
Equality and Fair Play, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2014, 5:30 PM EDT), https://www
.theguardian.com/football/blog/2014/sep/20/footballs-fat-cats-end-hope-equality-and-
fair-play [https://perma.cc/M7RM-6QR5] (“[T]he big, established clubs, who already
make a lot of money, are entitled to spend it – as long as they don’t go too far beyond
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conflict between the incumbent-entrenchment effect and the distinc-
tive purposes that supposedly justify segregation. At the same time,
they are necessarily, if implicitly, criticizing the market’s internal re-
distribution mechanisms.
Economists have explored these claims. Some models of financial
fair play show that big clubs will only become more dominant over
time on account of the break-even rule’s prohibition of capital injec-
tions from white knights.108 Others argue that wealthy individuals
would look to gain control mainly of high-profile, winning clubs, and
financial fair play rules therefore at least prevent the reinforcement of
skewed competition.109
My point here is to observe how this sort of dispute arises. A mar-
ket’s purpose is perceived to be endangered by the exchange and use
of foreign currencies. There is, therefore, an effort to prohibit such
exchange. Dissenters then argue (a) that black-market leakage will
render segregation ineffective or (b) that segregation only serves to
reinforce existing inequalities within the market and that the market’s
weak distribution rules and segregation rules result from a failure of a
political economy dominated by strong incumbents. Only power from
outside the market can disrupt this grip on power and restore equality
or competitiveness to the market.
The objective of this Article is not to resolve this conflict but to
observe that our institutional model helps to see why these disputes
are an unsurprising consequence of strongly purposed markets’ adja-
cency to weakly purposed or differently purposed ones. And these
fights are recapitulated under similar conceptual dynamics in other
domains, like campaign finance, despite bearing different nouns and
verbs.
B. Campaign Finance Reform Efforts
The problems of the campaign finance market are well-known.110
Elections for public office are supposed to reflect an aggregate prefer-
ence of the electorate, and basic democratic principles require that
each citizen has at least a roughly equal say in the outcome and a
their profits. But those clubs wishing to join them, who don’t earn anywhere near as
much, are restricted to their far smaller incomes. It’s a charter for fat cats, a cartel in
all but name.”).
108. See, e.g., Markus Sass, Long-term Competitive Balance Under UEFA Financial
Fair Play Regulations, (Otto Von Guericke Univ. Madgeburd, Faculty of Econ. &
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5/2012, 2012).
109. See Franck, supra note 92, at 209–10.
110. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 3–11 (2002); David A. Strauss, What’s the Prob-
lem? Ackerman and Ayres on Campaign Finance Reform, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 723
(2003); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 688–90 (1998); Daniel H. Lowen-
stein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 301 (1989).
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roughly equal ability to participate. These criteria entail at least some-
what proportional representation and that votes for representatives be
equally distributed among the electorate. Our law reflects these
conclusions.111
But the casting of ballots is not the whole of elections. Political cam-
paigns strive mightily to influence the voters’ casting of votes, the unit
of power in the electoral market that voters have been allocated.
Campaigning is a classic secondary influence market, a market allocat-
ing resources used to affect the spending of currency within the pri-
mary market. Supposing campaigns are effective and that their
effectiveness increases with their resources,112 the market that distrib-
utes campaigning resources is causally connected to the outcome of
elections themselves. It follows that if the above desiderata for the
distribution of power among the electorate are to be satisfied, then
individuals’ ability to affect the relative balance of campaign resources
must be controlled.
On the other hand, there is perhaps no area of public discourse
closer to the heart of our reasons for protecting the freedom of speech
than political debate concerning elections.113 The Supreme Court has
concluded, perhaps wrongly, that the regulation of transfers of re-
sources to a campaign is a regulation of an individual’s speech.114 In
other words, not only are the outputs of the secondary influence mar-
ket, campaign speech, protected by courts but so too is the currency
exchange that turns other markets’ dollars into units of power in this
secondary influence market. Courts have often struck down efforts
not only to suppress election-related speech but also to interfere with
the ability to finance, and therefore allocate among campaigns, such
speech.115
Let us analyze this problem in terms of our institutional model of
markets. At bottom, there is a market for choosing public officehold-
ers (or resolving ballot initiatives). Its currency is the vote. The deci-
sion rule is, generally, threshold majoritarianism. That is, the
candidate or position receiving the most votes is selected. An individ-
ual vote is completely redistributive, meaning whether and however it
111. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of politi-
cal equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address,
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing—one person, one vote.”).
112. See supra note 69.
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“[I]t can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.”) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971). See also Hellman, supra note 74, at 1984 (noting that the Court
has “treat[ed] contributing money to a campaign as one of the central ways that a
citizen participates in politics . . . plac[ing it] on par with voting”).
114. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16–20.
115. Id.
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is cast, it is confiscated after each decision and reallocated, one per
eligible person, for each decision.
Last, currency exchange is nearly universally forbidden by law.116
Virtually no form of power gathered in other markets may be used to
acquire more votes.117 This extends not only to those markets seam-
lessly connected through a dollar-based currency, but also to other
markets. For example, the “Hatch Act” forbids most members of the
executive branch from “us[ing] their ‘official authority or influence . . .
[to] affect[ ] the result of an election.’”118
To summarize:
TABLE 3.
Rule Type The Democratic Election Market 
Currency Definition Explicit vote 
Decision Rules Threshold majority decision 
Redistribution Rules Immediate, discrete resetting to single vote 
Secondary Influence 
Market Regulations 
Extensive campaigning, regulation of which is 
subject to constitutional constraints 
Currency Exchange 
Rules 
Hermetic—virtually no allowable exchanges 
with other markets 
116. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 n.1 (2000)
(collecting federal and state statutes prohibiting exchanging votes for things of value,
what Hasen calls “core vote buying”).
117. Hasen helpfully surveys conventional rationales for this ban, including: a com-
mitment to equality, concerns vote buyers would seek arbitrage opportunities for rent
seeking, and concerns that commodification of votes will cause voters to see their
power in more self-interested light. Id. at 1329–37.
118. Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1993). As summarized by the Congressional Re-
search Service:
All officers and employees in the executive branch, other than the President
and Vice President, are still generally restricted in the following ways:
(1) They may not use their “official authority or influence for the purpose of
interfering with or affecting the result of an election.”
(2) They are generally restricted from soliciting, accepting or receiving polit-
ical campaign contributions from any person.
(3) They may not run for elective office in most “partisan” elections.
(4) They are prohibited from soliciting or discouraging participation in any
political activities by a person who has an application for a grant, contract or
other funds pending before their agencies, or is the subject of an ongoing
audit or investigation by their agencies.
(5) They are generally prohibited from engaging in partisan campaign activ-
ity on federal property, on official duty time, while wearing a uniform or
insignia identifying them as federal officials or employees, or while using a
government vehicle.
JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., 98-885, “HATCH ACT” AND OTHER RE-
STRICTIONS IN FEDERAL LAW ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOY-
EES (1998).
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Next, let us turn to the thriving secondary influence markets paired
to many elections. Campaigning is the spending of resources in order
to influence how votes are cast.119 The campaigning market is highly
regulated, but so too, through constitutional law, are its regulations
highly regulated.120
TABLE 4.
Rule Type The Political Campaign Market (Secondary 
to the Election Market) 
Currency Definition Cash 
Decision Rules Voluntary, dyadic transactions with media 
companies 
Redistribution Rules None 
Secondary Influence 
Market Regulations 
None, basically the marketing efforts of 
various consultants (and grifters) 
Currency Exchange 
Rules 
Contribution limits for campaigns; looser 
rules (non-coordination) on independent 
expenditure campaigns 
While the vote is the ultimate source of power within the election
market, secondary influence markets are thought to be exceedingly
important here.121 The campaigning market allocates the ability to
marshal rival tools of persuasion to direct individual electors to turn-
out and to vote for one outcome or another.122 The basic question is
how this latter allocation should be made and how allocations may be
exchanged. Our market-design options range between absolute prohi-
bition, where no market is even permitted to arise, to laissez faire, in
which a market that uses dollars as a currency is permitted to decide
to produce persuasion unlimited in kind and volume and is completely
connected to all other markets that themselves permit connection.
Current U.S. law generally limits personal contributions to political
campaigns but places no limits on expenditures by campaigns or by
independent advocates.123 While the prevention of bribery and cor-
ruption has been held to be an important governmental interest,124
justifying limits on contributions to politicians, equalization of the
119. See Stratmann, supra note 69, at 1.
120. See id. at 2.
121. See supra note 69.
122. See id.
123. See Michael S. Kang, The Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 537–48 (2016) (summarizing the state of constitutional
limitations on campaign finance regulations).
124. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206–07 (2014).
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ability of candidates or members of the public to speak on election
matters has not been:
This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest
for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption. We have consistently rejected attempts to
suppress campaign speech based on other legislative objectives. No
matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable govern-
mental objective to “level the playing field,” or to “level electoral
opportunities,” or to “equaliz[e] the financial resources of candi-
dates.” The First Amendment prohibits such legislative attempts to
“fine-tun[e]” the electoral process, no matter how well
intentioned.125
Thus, the Supreme Court has prevented regulation to achieve a pur-
pose in the secondary influence market, equality of influence, that is
widely perceived as indispensable within the primary market. Like
other secondary influence markets, the actual purposes of the cam-
paign-speech market are intended to bear on those of the primary
market, the electoral system. Even though there are strict segregation
rules preventing externally acquired power from being exchanged for
votes in the election market, there is, under existing law, no serious
bar on exchange between the campaign market and other markets.
And so, while the route external power must take to be exchanged for
the electoral currency of the ballot is indirect, passing through the sec-
ondary influence market, it may nonetheless get there.
FIGURE 7.
Buyers and Sellers
Market
Allocation
Whom to 
elect?
125. Id.
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Absent segregation rules between external markets and the
campaigning market, there will be a normatively undesirable correla-
tion between power in ordinary markets, power in the campaign mar-
ket, and thus, ultimately, power in the electoral market.
It is, of course, not novel to observe that wealth devolved to cam-
paigns can influence elections, but the perspective provided by the in-
stitutional model makes obvious that alternative design choices are
available to us, that whether a market is serving its purposes or not is
a matter with which we should be concerned and responsive, and that
failures and unintended consequences are similar in nature across dif-
ferent sorts of markets. Just as the institutional model reveals the cam-
paign-speech problem as the type of problem that will attract efforts
at segregation, it also makes obvious that the counterarguments are
instantiations of critiques of segregation rules more generally.
For example, one of the more widely known proposals to overhaul
the campaign finance system on democratic grounds is the “patriot
dollars” proposal of Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres.126 They propose
that there be a large public fund for political campaigns but that the
distribution of publicly provided funds be determined by individual
voters.127 Each voter would receive fifty of these patriot dollars that
could be given to the candidates for federal office of the voter’s choos-
ing.128 Their system would not strictly segregate the campaign-speech
market, because contributions of ordinary dollars would still be per-
mitted so long as they are made anonymously, as with patriot dol-
lars.129 But exchange between patriot dollars and ordinary dollars
would be forbidden.130
This design poses some obvious challenges, as Ackerman and Ayres
acknowledge. For example, David Strauss points to the potential for
liberty dollars to be “swamped” by directly contributed U.S. dol-
lars.131 The critique here is one of imperfect segregation. If connection
with an external market endangers the primary market’s agreed-upon
purpose, then one must either completely segregate the markets or at
least substantially attenuate the external market’s impact. This effort
may fail for at least two generic reasons. First, a black market in cur-
rency exchange may arise. In the case of campaign-finance segrega-
126. ACKERMAN & AYERS, supra note 110, at 4–9 (proposing (a) that donations be
made anonymously, to combat quid pro quo corruption and (b) that contributions be
in the form of public vouchers, equally distributed to members of the voting public).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 71–75, 85 (discussing a required allocation of the fifty patriot dollars
among candidates for the House, the Senate, and the Presidency). See also Bruce
Ackerman & Ian Ayres, ‘Patriot Dollars’ Put Money Where the Votes Are, L.A. TIMES
(July 17, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-jul-17-oe-
ackerman17-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q8LR-5L7E].
129. ACKERMAN & AYERS, supra note 110, at 71–75.
130. Id. at 16.
131. Strauss, supra note 110, at 740.
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tion, a black market would amount to illegal campaign contributions.
Second, if exchange is not forbidden but attempts have been made to
render the suspect currency practically irrelevant by subsidizing an-
other currency,  as in the Ackerman and Ayres proposal, there is al-
ways the danger that the suspect currency will prove stronger and
more determined than hoped.
Other critics of segregation of the campaign-finance market have
similarly pointed to the leakage problem. Campaign information and
speech take many forms, including news coverage. Should production
of all forms of speech that might influence the decision of a voter, no
matter the source, be limited by the resource allocation principles of a
segregated, secondary influence market? That seems dangerous, and it
further seems that any conceivable attempt to corral campaign-speech
into a single, segregated market will inevitably engender many hard
cases at the fuzzy boundary.132
Another generic segregation critique that has been leveled against
campaign-speech segregation is segregation’s danger of entrenching
incumbents by full exposure to the internal market’s norms without
external recourse.133 If name recognition and free press (and perhaps
favorable district lines in the case of some elections) advantage incum-
bents, it might take white knights to inject enough persuasive informa-
tion into the speech market to ensure voters give a challenger a fair
shake.134
Our interdisciplinary analysis captures, in general terms and as a
consequence of more general dynamics, the particular notions ex-
pressed, for example, by Ronald Dworkin:
Citizens play two roles in a democracy. As voters they are, collec-
tively, the final referees or judges of political contests. But they also
participate, as individuals, in the contests they collectively judge:
they are candidates, supporters, and political activists; they lobby
and demonstrate for and against government measures, and they
consult and argue about them with their fellow citizens. The individ-
ual-choice argument concentrates exclusively on citizens in the first
132. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 663, 677–78 (1997) (“Popular attitudes about public policy do not exist
in nature, but are formed largely in response to cues from political candidates and
party leaders. Moreover, the institutional press—itself owned by large corporations
commanding disproportionate power and resources—plays a large role in shaping
public opinion. Any attempt to equalize campaign spending would still leave un-
touched any ‘distortion’ from the role of the press.”).
133. See Strauss, supra note 110, at 740. Ackerman and Ayres argue that their
mixed public and private system combined with anonymity requirements limit the
danger of entrenchment under their proposal. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 110,
at 35–40.
134. See Sullivan, supra note 132, at 686–87 (“Incumbency confers enormous nonfi-
nancial advantages: name recognition, opportunity to deliver benefits, publicity from
the free press, and the franking privilege. To offset these advantages, challengers must
amass substantial funds.”).
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role and neglects them in the second. For when wealth is unfairly
distributed and money dominates politics, then, though individual
citizens may be equal in their vote and their freedom to hear the
candidates they wish to hear, they are not equal in their own ability
to command the attention of others for their own candidates, inter-
ests, and convictions.135
Indeed, we all play many roles in our society: family members, vot-
ers, buyers, sellers, workers, viewers, performers, and more. Society
just is the union of all these cooperative instances, including the link-
ages among them. And the adjustment of these linkages is as impor-
tant as setting the basic rules within each instance.136
C. The General Pattern
The parallels between financial fair play and campaign finance re-
form efforts hint at the power of abstract thinking. First, being clear
about the degrees of freedom in market design shows clearly what is
taken for granted in the markets we have. These un-designed features
might cause conflict with the laudable purposes we otherwise attribute
to these instances of cooperation. For example, why should success in
financial markets give one usable currency in the market for the per-
suasion of others on matters we otherwise believe are appropriate for
democratic decisionmaking? There is nothing natural about dollars
themselves that should lull us into thinking that they belong
everywhere.
Second, some dynamics that seem particular to a social structure
might in fact be consequences of that market’s design choices and
reoccur in seemingly disparate social situations in which the same de-
sign choices are made. Here, we have seen that democratic social pur-
poses in elections and competitive goals in high-profile sports are
likely to be frustrated in the absence of substantial market segregation
rules. However, we run into two familiar problems: black markets and
tyranny of incumbents. Segregation will create pressure to find loop-
holes and engage in illicit currency exchange. And because strict mar-
ket segregation rules tend to protect the market’s incumbents, who by
definition benefit from the market’s internal rules, white-knight infu-
sions of power from other markets may be needed if incumbency ad-
vantages are significant enough to be detrimental to the market’s
purposes.
135. Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 17,
1996), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/10/17/the-curse-of-american-politics/
[https://perma.cc/LCG2-2YK4].
136. Deborah Hellman reminds us that which institution is charged with identifying
the instances and adjusting the linkages is, ultimately, the critical question. Hellman,
supra note 74, at 2017 (giving examples of parents deciding whether raking leaves is a
familial obligation, Congress deciding the degree to which health care is a market or
need-based good, and the Supreme Court’s decision that it should determine the
boundary between campaign finance and bribery).
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TABLE 5.
Rule Type Campaigning Football 
Currency Definition Cash Cash 
Decision Rules Dyadic with media 
companies 
Dyadic with players 
and source clubs 
Redistribution Rules None Weak (TV rights) 
Secondary Influence 
Market Regulations 
None None 
Currency Exchange 
Rules 
Contribution limits, 
collusion controls 
Financial Fair Play 
IV. MORAL RIGHTS AND OTHER PUZZLING MARKETS
The examples of labor markets in European football and the financ-
ing of American political campaigns demonstrated that viewing our
social world as assemblages of connected markets can show that issues
in disparate domains are conceptually isomorphic. The goods may be
different, the actors and their goals distinct, but the resort to segrega-
tion and its potential ensuing pitfalls are similar. The theory, then,
serves the usual purpose of such theories: to reveal apparently distinct
phenomena as merely different aspects of the same thing. We have
developed here a class of model, the institutional model of markets,
that helps us to understand in simple and identical terms what would
otherwise seem bespoke responses to particular problems.
But the theory can also help us see more simply the legal complex-
ity within domains. Consider the problem of so-called moral rights,
the rights retained by artists to prevent, inter alia, destruction or alter-
ation of their works even when those works have been sold to
others.137 There is no worldwide consensus on what these rights are,
who should have them, or whether they can be waived. In the United
States, for example, the Visual Artists Rights Act secures federal pro-
tection of moral rights. The Act primarily protects visual artists’ repu-
tations by giving artists control over whether their name is used in
connection with an artwork.138 But the Act also gives such artists the
right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature.”139
These rights are non-transferable, exist only during the author’s life-
time, and are waivable.140 In contrast, moral rights in France are per-
petual, pass to an artist’s heirs, and are non-waivable.141
137. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 266–69
(2009).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
139. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
140. Id. § 106A(e).
141. See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIE´TE´ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] [CODE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY] art. L121-1 (declaring that an author’s moral rights “shall be
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One way to see these sorts of laws is as efforts to sculpt the extent
of the “property rights” in works of art: one’s right to a Picasso con-
sists in this but not in that. Here, we are engaged in domain-specific
calibration of the bundle of sticks that compose the ownership of
art.142 Our theoretical commitments to autonomy, the social role of
art, the connection between creator and creation, and more might in-
form our arguments concerning these rights.
We might, though, perceive that with respect to the distinct social
decisions concerning the allocation of works of art on the one hand
and whether to modify or destroy works of art on the other, different
decisionmaking structures are called for. With respect to allocation,
the argument might go, artistic effort comes at the expense of other
forms of labor, and so it makes sense to connect that decision seam-
lessly with other markets that also allocate fruits of labor. Of course,
not all societies may wish to atomize the decision whether to direct
artistic effort in relative proportion to its demand. They may prefer
patronage or very high public subsidy to direct the production of art
that would not be achieved by individual decisions to sacrifice other
goods.
Whatever institutional choice a society makes with regard to art-
work-allocation decisions, it may perceive the choice whether to mod-
ify or destroy an existing work as a different decision for which its
allocation market is ill-suited. If this were our choice, it would not be
enough, as we have learned in the context of football and elections,
just to create a different decisionmaking institution for destruction de-
cisions. We must go further and institute some form of segregation
from other markets if there is to be no necessary correlation between
the destruction decision and power won in other markets.
At least a few ways we might do this are obvious. An absolute pro-
hibition on destruction throws destruction decisions to legislatures or
courts with the power to make exceptions or to amend, while at the
same time segregating those decisions from financially successful ac-
tors to the same extent (however imperfect) as other such public deci-
sions. We might instead allow destruction but require the artist’s
consent at the time of destruction. If we forbid payment for this deci-
sion, we have again chosen segregation, and we must here again be
concerned with illicit currency exchange. If we merely require artist
consent without forbidding payment, we have chosen not to segregate
the destruction decision but have recognized two markets in two
goods: the allocation right and the destruction right.
perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible”); id. art. L121-5 (absolutely prohibiting
destruction of the master copy of the final version of an audiovisual work). Of course,
an artist is not required to enforce these rights, but neither is he or she bound by an
agreement not to enforce them.
142. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 794–96
(2005).
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The institutional model of markets gives us a way to appreciate that
we have in fact established decisionmaking structures that may be
more or less suited to the purposes we actually have. The argument
from ownership, that I have a right to alter or destroy a work that I
otherwise “own,” has no persuasive power over us that is not ob-
scured by and embedded in the complex concept of ownership.143
Under the institutional model, we debate rules concerning what deci-
sionmaking structure should possess the right destroy. And we criti-
cize those rules and the assignment of the decision to that institution
for their fit with our social purposes. Moreover, we are attuned to the
potentially destructive influence of other markets on this one. It just
does not follow from our resort to ordinary markets in order to allo-
cate works of art that we necessarily commit to such markets the
power to destroy. That conclusion is clearer when we see markets in
their more general aspect, as decisionmaking institutions complete
with internal power arrangements and segregation rules.
We might also find our institutional vantage point helpful to under-
stand taboo markets or “repugnant” transactions. Allocations of cer-
tain goods, including human organs and sex, by ordinary market
transactions have been argued to “diminish[ ] or corrupt[ ]” them.144
While I leave many important details for future work, note that under-
standing these issues becomes easier when we start at the institutional
design phase, eschewing the invitation to argue from a natural market
baseline.
To begin with, the adjective “repugnant” in “repugnant transac-
tions” is an umbrella term for various objections, including “corrup-
tion,” meaning “violence” or “denigration” of “how goods are
properly valued.”145 The football example shows that corruption ob-
jections of this sort may arise not only from the fact of market transac-
tion simpliciter but from allocation accomplished with money from a
wrong source. There, observing the purposes of player allocation led
us to expect support for some types of traditional exchange, such as
buying players with financial power gotten from gate receipts or shirt
sales, but not those carried out with financial power gotten from non-
football sources. It is not money or exchange itself but the connection
between normatively incompatible power sources that caused some to
cry “doping.”
Ultimately, of course, the problem of distributing kidneys and sex,
as with all else, is to decide on a collective mechanism for allocation,
but the question of whether money can be used to do this is not bi-
143. Id. at 791.
144. See MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 94 (1998), https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/sandel00.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3AGQ-7NKN].
145. I. Glenn Cohen, On Repugnance, Distribution, and the Global Kidney Ex-
change, 175 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 20, 22–23 (2019).
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nary. Advocating for the prohibition of repugnant transactions is a call
for the segregation of one market from some other markets. That
often means barring cash, as in the noncontroversial example of bar-
ring bribes paid to judges and in the more controversial kidney market
example.146 But sometimes it just means barring cash gathered in par-
ticular markets and maybe not every cash-based market (as in the
football example). Or it can mean placing limits on the per-person
volume of currency exchange between markets, as with limits on polit-
ical campaign donations. For example, allowing only compensatory
payments to surrogate mothers constructs a limit on the amount of
currency that can be exchanged, and it does so, wisely or not, for a
particular purpose.147 Such a rule suppresses raw ability to pay (power
in cash-connected markets) as a controlling concern in surrogacy allo-
cation. Constraining payment to compensatory rather than induce-
ment levels is an attempt to preserve need and donative intent as the
primary decisionmaking criteria.
When we focus our attention on the collision between the con-
verged-upon justifications available to reach a decision and the rea-
sons available for decisions in some other markets, many objections to
“markets” are revealed as critiques of particular decisionmaking ratio-
nales, the power to apply them, and the exchange of the currency of
that power for currency in a target market.
Consider Margaret Jane Radin’s “domino theory,” which observes
that markets in a noncommodified good are problematic when it is not
possible to maintain both noncommodified and commodified versions
of the good at the same time.148 This may occur when market rhetoric
infects our ability to enjoy “non-market” versions of the same good.149
While abstract, the point is easy to grasp concretely. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that there were an unregulated market in children. And imag-
ine being bombarded by advertising highlighting the attractive traits
of various children, establishing an order of worth as with so many
consumer products. It might be hard, the domino theory goes, to
avoid having one’s own relationship with a non-purchased child in-
fected by the market’s rhetoric, to continue thinking of their eye color,
apparent intelligence, height, creativity, sulkiness, goofiness, and over-
146. Kim Krawiec, Kidneys Without Money, 175 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 4,
6 (2019).
147. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of
Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 80–81 (2007).
148. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1913–14,
1922, 1925–26 (1987) (explaining the theory and inviting the reader to imagine
whether non-commodified sexuality and non-commodified relationships with children
would be possible were sex and children, respectively, to be fully commodified). The
domino theory was one of three justifications for inalienability rules that Radin con-
sidered. The other two were coercion and direct moral objections to economic valua-
tion of a good. Id. at 1909–12.
149. Id. at 1912.
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all personality as joyously individual rather than upsides and down-
sides as one would the features of a car.150
In the domino theory, we again see an argument for segregation
arising from a supposed conflict between the normative purpose of
the “non-market market” and the purposes of the broader markets
seeking currency exchange. To have the allocation of children, for ex-
ample, influenced by currency imported from other markets would
disrupt the very purpose of conception and parental bonding in our
noncommodified parenting culture.
Radin’s focus on market rhetoric is a clue that domino-type harms
to noncommodified markets arise indirectly through secondary influ-
ence markets. Indeed, the examples given above suggest that influ-
ence markets may erode the norms sustaining the noncommodified
markets in children and in sex, even though the influence markets’
purposes are to affect allocations in the parallel commodified markets.
So even if we intend for prostitution to exist alongside noncommodi-
fied forms of sexual intimacy, influence markets allocating persuasive
effort toward the former cannot help but influence allocations in the
latter. Radin’s prescription for non-ideal, incomplete commodification
of sexual services, legalizing prostitution but outlawing middlemen
and perhaps advertising, can be seen as protecting the segregation of
the noncommodified market at the expense of some efficiency in allo-
cation in the commodified market.151 Even this is imperfect, as Radin
recognizes that so-called noncommodified, intimate sexual relation-
ships are in fact influenced by power in other markets, mediated
through partners’ needs, wants, and unarticulated feelings of
attraction.152
The institutional model of markets reveals this sort of dynamic as
an instance of an unsurprising pattern. Where one finds markets, one
finds secondary influence markets. Where one wishes to segregate,
one faces black-market currency exchanges, entrenchment of incum-
bents, and decisions concerning how to regulate or even ban secon-
dary influence markets.153 And so the importance of preserving the
power arrangements one wishes to see prevail in the primary market
must be evaluated next to the possibility and costs of realizing them
given these difficulties. Where the suppression of black markets is
costly, in resources or morals, and where their interference with pri-
mary market norms is substantial, one can expect segregation efforts
not to get very far. Some criticisms of the official market in narcotics
150. Id. at 1925 (“If we permit babies to be sold, we commodify . . . the baby itself
[and] . . . all of its personal attributes . . . .”).
151. Id. at 1924–25.
152. Id. at 1922–24.
153. One can recognize here that regulations or bans of secondary influence mar-
kets, as with primary markets, do not ensure results in the world. Black secondary
markets are a natural response to such suppression efforts.
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(a complex market mediated by physician-decisionmakers’ determina-
tions of need and safety) in light of thriving and often violent black
markets are along these lines.154
V. SEGREGATION AS A CHOICE
With an abstract understanding of webs of markets, shorn of con-
fusing particularities, and with a few examples in mind to guide our
intuitions, let us consider the circumstances under which we should
expect pressure for segregation regulations and when they might
make sense.
First, to what degree does a decision of the market affect decisions
made in other markets? A decision to produce a certain number of
televisions and to distribute them in a particular way is a choice to
devote a certain amount of labor and material to television allocation.
Those resources are rival, and so this choice affects choices made in all
other markets that depend on the same pool of labor and material.155
Factors common to both markets would impede segregation, even if
desired, and would form an indirect communications network coordi-
nating reasons. If two markets are coupled so that a decision in either
constrains choice in the other, segregation is less likely to occur and to
be successful.
Second, does the market have widely agreed-upon purposes, at
some level of generality, that distinguish it? Most people do not have
strong convictions about exactly how many televisions should be pro-
duced and exactly who should own which of them. This is a market in
which the participants lack a strong sense of purpose distinct from that
of many familiar markets: satisfaction of individual preferences to the
extent practicable. Again, segregation from other such markets does
not seem to be justified on norm-preservation grounds. The reasons
that are grounds for decisions as to refrigerator allocation are not dif-
ferent in kind from those that ground television allocation decisions.
And so we do not fear causal coupling.
Contrast the television market with the market for judicial deci-
sions. First, adjudication’s factors are rival with those of other markets
in only the weakest sense. As with all human decisionmaking endeav-
ors, adjudication requires labor. But the extent to which adjudication
is rival with other markets, affecting through its decisions their deci-
sions, is an attribute we usually endeavor to make explicit and to
ground in justification. And while the purpose of the adjudication
154. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173,
2190–92 (2016) (discussing the social and economic consequences of the war on
drugs).
155. This influence includes adding to the incentive to increase the supply of these
jointly important resources. I do not mean to imply that television production is in
zero-sum competition with, say, refrigerator production, only that the decisions in
each sector are coupled.
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market is indeed contested in that people may differ concerning their
theories of justice and judicial prerogative, there is in our culture a
convergence on the impartial resolution of disputes, according to a
distinctively legal process, as the general purpose of the judicial deci-
sionmaking apparatus. It is the social gravitational field generated by
the support for this purpose that makes the truly idiosyncratic rules of
adjudication feel natural to a group otherwise conditioned to object to
this mode of decisionmaking in other domains. In sum, unlike the tele-
vision market, the adjudication market is not inextricably rival with
markets in consumer goods, say, and it has a distinctive purpose that
conflicts with the reasons for allocation in those markets.
A number of market design decisions thus follow from these facts.
First, we should expect to see efforts to segregate adjudication cur-
rency from dollars. And, of course, we do. The market’s currency, a
monopoly of decisionmaking authority granted by virtue of judicial
office, is fully segregated from nearly all other markets. Criminal stat-
utes in every state bar exchanges of money for favorable decisions, for
example.156 Furthermore, again consistent with our expectations, the
judiciary’s secondary influence market is highly regulated by rules of
civil and criminal procedure, prohibitions on ex parte communications,
bar requirements, and rules of evidence.
Notably, power in legislative markets can buy power in judicial mar-
kets. A legislature wishing to achieve patterns of future decisions in
judicial markets can sometimes use its power to do so, directly by
passing statutes and indirectly through the judicial confirmation
power. If our model of social reality includes ordinary, dollar-based
markets, legislatures, and the judiciary, then we could indeed trace
influence from the legislature’s secondary influence markets, gov-
erned by dollars, through the legislature, governed by votes, to the
judiciary, bound by its interpretation of statutes. Whether this causal
linkage is problematic depends on the extent to which it occurs and
the socially specific extent to which the reasons in these various mar-
kets conflict.
Player markets in European football follow a similar pattern. We
observe there a convergence around a set of purposes of the player
allocation market distinct from the more generic purposes attributable
to markets in oil and other commodities. Rivalry and a concern with
heterogeneous needs and preferences may indeed justify the un-
restricted currency exchange observed in these latter markets where
cash is a standardized unit of control. But (a), the universe of profes-
sional football players is small, and it is likely that their opportunities
in football (at the level at which financial fair play becomes impor-
tant) are far more valuable than their next best opportunities. The
goods being allocated are not exactly rival in the larger sense that
156. See supra note 73.
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their deployment here comes at the expense of their deployment in
other markets. And (b), there is a notable convergence of distinctive
purpose among market participants: maintaining financially stable and
entertainingly competitive leagues—feeding the sense that clubs
should grow with their support. Here, we need not ban dollars; we
need only track them through accounting to manage the currency ex-
change between forbidden markets (those not relevant to organic sup-
port) and permitted ones (those where value is gained ultimately from
sport).
The hypothesis I suggest here is tentative but plausible. Pressure to
segregate a market will arise from the confluence of two sorts of facts:
(1) an unusual level of convergence among its participants concerning
its normative purposes and (2) little rivalry with respect to other mar-
kets, meaning that decisionmaking within the market is only very
loosely, if at all, coupled with other significant markets.
TABLE 6.
 Contested Purpose Convergence of 
Purpose 
Rivalry with Other 
Markets 
Connection (non-
segregation) 
Segregation pressure 
met with 
counterattack 
Non-rivalry with 
Other Markets 
No consensus on 
segregation; internal 
exchange; pluralism in 
allocation 
Segregation 
VI. CONCLUSION
The institutional description of markets discussed in this Article il-
lustrates not a singular principle but an approach to understanding
human cooperation. From familial decisionmaking, to homeowner as-
sociations, to the manufacture and distribution of cars, a society has
many different sorts of decisions to reach at many different scales. If
we identify a germ of similarity in the decisionmaking structures es-
tablished in each, we can see more clearly why law and social norms
sometimes tie different decisionmaking markets closely together and
sometimes wall them off from one another, segregating them.
If instead, however, we label one thing a market and another collec-
tive decisionmaking structure something else and then conclude they
should be governed differently and segregated because they are differ-
ent things, we miss the opportunity to ask the essential question: Why
is this structure unlike that one in a way that justifies their segrega-
tion? Assuming ontology from habitual use of words yields the inco-
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herent approach to law much criticized by the legal realists.157 Our
labeling of one institution a “private market” and another a “public
institution” or a different sort of private institution leads to what Felix
Cohen called “transcendental nonsense,” unless those labels represent
some empirically distinct meanings that relate to our regulatory con-
cerns.158 It is all too easy to deploy entirely different vocabularies,
ones which in fact embed and hide different normative ideals, on the
basis of intuition rather than function.
Indeed, through repeated use, we may lazily slide into thinking vari-
ous cooperative structures are fundamentally different on account
only of the rhetoric that predominates in and around them and which
arises from baselines long ago taken for granted and ossified. For ex-
ample, a market premised on enforcing “voluntary” exchanges of cap-
ital is identified as privately controlled and somehow not public. This
labeling obscures the fact that the market almost certainly depends for
its efficacy on collective enforcement, the details of which spin out
countless mechanisms through which various “public” institutions in
fact influence the market’s decisionmaking. In what sense is such a
thing different from a market of individuals who are chosen according
to various qualifications and who reach decisions through equally dis-
tributed votes? To say the latter is public while the former is private is
conclusory without more analysis and certainly not sufficient to count
as a reason, on its own, for disparate regulatory treatment.
Perhaps the most critical change in understanding that comes with
the shift in perspective I have advocated here is a new capacity to see,
and perhaps an incapacity not to see, all our institutions in pursuit of
purposes. Markets shorn of animating purpose and bearing connec-
tions to other markets that go unseen or naturalized by the forces of
time and rhetoric lead us to act without mind, as if our world had
always been so. But once we begin again to see purposes and to see
currencies and other constitutive rules as yoked to these purposes, we
can ask new questions and, as demonstrated in this Article, see old
questions in a new light.
One of these questions, simultaneously new and old, is when to seg-
regate decisionmaking markets. There are difficulties both conceptual
(perceiving the markets and identifying their right purposes) and prac-
tical (effectively affecting the distributions of power, rules of internal
power transfer, and rules of inter-institutional exchange). While these
are indeed challenges, we can feel a little better taking even hesitant
steps to meet them once we realize that we have been acting and step-
ping all along.
157. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820–21 (1935) (identifying some “magic ‘solving words’” in law
and noting their circularity).
158. Id.
